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OPTING OUT OF LIABILITY: 
THE FORTHCOMING, NEAR-TOTAL 
DEMISE OF THE MODERN CL ASS ACTION 
Myriam Gilles* 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there have been hundreds of academic articles and 
scores of books written about class action litigation.' The law reviews 
abound with doctrinal critiques, letters to Congress, moralist manifestos, 
and economists' prescriptions for optimized class action rules. Reading it 
all, one would certainly think that abusive class action litigation is running 
amok in the United States. 
On the doctrinal front, for example, Professor Martin Redish raises the 
objection that much of contemporary class action litigation is, in reality, a 
"lawyer-driven" hunt for bounty and that, when a court in such a case ap­
plies Rule 23 procedures to a substantive federal statute, it is effectively 
grafting a qui tam provision onto a law that contains no such remedy. Re­
dish would have courts hold that Rule 23 may not be applied to lawyer­
driven suits, lest it conflict with the remedial scheme of the substantive con­
gressional enactment upon which the suit is based. Alternatively, he would 
settle for legislation banning the widespread scourge of lawyer-driven class 
actions.2 
From the moralist comer, Professor Charles Wolfram raises the some­
what less nuanced objection that plaintiffs' lawyers are, well, immoral. 
Professor Wolfram's attack focuses on the "low state of ethical practice in 
class actions" and the "sell-out lawyers who, for millions in fees, are willing 
* 
Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. A.B. 1993, Harvard; J.D. 1 996, Yale.-
Ed. I want to first thank Gary Friedman, who in fairness deserves more of a coauthor credit than a 
thank you. I would also thank participants in faculty workshops at the Stanford/Yale Junior Faculty 
Forum, and Virginia, Duke, Columbia, and Hofstra law schools for lively workshops on this paper. 
In particular, thank you to Jennifer Arlen, Mark Budnitz, Paul Carrington, Erwin Chemerinsky, 
George Cohen, Chris Drahozal, Cindy Estlund, Catherine Fisk, Risa Goluboff, Michael Herz, Pam 
Karlan, Jody Krauss, Melanie Leslie, Francis McGovern, Judith Resnik, Bill Rubenstein, Richard 
Schragger, Bob Scott, John Setear, Stewart Sterk, Jean Stemlight, Peter Strauss, Susan Sturm, Rip 
Verkeuke, Stephen Ware, and Ted White for careful reading and helpful comments. All errors are my 
own. 
I. My focus here is on class action litigation and scholarship between the mid-1980s and 
the present. I have previously discussed the criticisms aimed at the class actions of the 1960s and 
'70s, which sought to desegregate schools, improve prison conditions, and obtain welfare rights for 
minorities and other disenfranchised citizens. See, e.g., Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural 
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 1 00  COLUM. L. 
REV. 1384 (2000). 
2. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersec­
tion of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 7 1 ,  77-83. 
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to sign away the rights of tens of thousands of faceless and lawyerless class 
members."3 The moralists4 purport to be pessimistic about "reform" efforts 
so long as a "sizable number of lawyers . . .  are attracted to the big-money 
rewards of morally compromised (but legal) professional work."5 
Law and economics, of course, has had a field day criticizing class ac­
tions. Economic analysis has led some scholars to conclude that the agency 
costs inherent in "entrepreneurial litigation" (that's law and economics for 
lawyer-driven suits) produce inefficiencies that can only be addressed by a 
free market for legal claims, in which attorneys may purchase outright the 
claims of class members. 6 Related scholarship focuses on auctioning the 
lead counsel position in class actions,7 on the problems of collusion between 
plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants,8 on the concomitant problems of self­
dealing by class counsel,9 or on the supposedly outsized leverage that class 
certification gives even the most baseless of class claims. 10 Indeed, eco-
3 .  Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics, 8 0  CORNELL L.  REV. 1228, 1 23 1  
( 1 995). 
4. Other moralist arguments relate to the values of promoting plaintiff autonomy and pre-
serving plaintiffs' voices in the class action mechanism, see Roger C. Cramton, Individualized 
Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions ": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L.  REV. 8 1 1 ,  
8 1 3  ( 1 995); insuring adequacy of class counsel and reducing opportunities for collusion between 
and among counsel, see Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem 
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1048 (1995); and identifying potential and actual con­
flicts of interest between the class and its counsel, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma 
of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 343, 1 376 (1995). 
5. Not content to disparage the morality of plaintiffs' lawyers or to take aim at their wallets, 
Professor Wolfram levels his best shots at their egos: "what one needs to succeed in the field of class 
action plaintiff lawyering are: ( I )  a plaintiff; (2) capital; (3) political skills; and (4) luck." Wolfram, 
supra note 3, at 1 23 1 .  Professor Coffee is notably more restrained, arguing that class actions (in 
particular, mass tort class actions) raise concerns about possible collusion among adverse counsel. 
Coffee, supra note 4, at 1 373-74. 
6. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs '  Attorney's Role in Class 
Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1 ( 1991 ). 
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Share­
holder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PRoss. ,  Summer 1985, at 5, 77-78; Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on 
the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COL UM. L. REV. 650 
(2002); Alon Hare) & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class Coun­
sel, 22 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 69 (2004); Julie Rubin, Comment, Auctioning Class Actions: Turning 
the Tables on Plaintiffs '  Lawyers' Abuse or Stripping the Plaintiff Wizards of Their Curtain, 52 Bus. 
LAW. 144 1 ,  1 446-50 ( 1 997). 
8. See, e.g. , John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of 
Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 85 1 ,  853 ( 1 995). 
9. See Charles Silver, Class Actions-Representative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA L. 
& EcoN. 1 94, 199-200 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
JO. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 878 ( 1 987); Bruce Hay 
& David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and 
Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L.  REV. 1377 (2000); William J. Lynk, The Courts and the Plaintiffs ' Bar: 
Awarding the Attorney's Fee in Class-Action Litigation, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 85 ( 1994). Professor 
Milton Handler put it most succinctly: "Any device which is workable only because it utilizes the 
threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement is not a rule of procedure-it 
is a form of legalized blackmail." Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innova­
tions in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. I, 9 (197 1 ). 
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nomic analysis has been brought to bear on virtually every imaginable issue 
related to class action litigation, prompting innumerable proposals for "re­
form." 
It is, I think, overly dramatic to say that all of this scholarship misses the 
point. And yet, almost universally, the staggering heap of academic reform 
proposals ignores a f undamental and transformative point: in the ongoing 
and ever-mutating battle between plaintiffs' lawyers and the protectors of 
corporate interests, the corporate guys are winning. And they are winning 
because they have developed a new set of tools powerful enough to imperil 
the very viability of class actions in many-actually, most-areas of the 
law. In fact, I believe it is likely that, with a handful of exceptions, class ac­
tions will soon be virtually extinct. 
Two factors guide this prediction: the demise of mass tort class actions 
and the rise of contractual class action waivers. First, as recently as ten years 
ago, a significant percentage of all class actions were tort cases; by most 
accounts, almost twenty percent. 1 1  Since that time, the mass tort class action 
has met a fate similar to that of the Dodo bird. The latter was last seen on 
the island of Mauritius in 1680; the former has rarely been glimpsed since 
the issuance of broad class decertification opinions by federal appellate 
courts in asbestos ,  tobacco, and product liability cases in the 1 980s and 
1 990s. 12 
Second, and more significantly, the vast majority of the remaining class 
actions are based on some sort of contractual relationship. Virtually all con­
sumer class actions, for example, arise out of some form of contract 
(adhesive or otherwise), just as employment discrimination class actions 
arise out of employment contracts. Federal antitrust class actions necessarily 
grow out of contracts (indeed, standing rules require as much) , and the same 
is true for class actions relating to insurance benefits, BRISA plans, mutual 
funds, franchise agreements, and an endless variety of other matters. 
All of these contract-based class actions are, I believe, on their way to 
Mauritius. Corporate caretakers have concocted an antigen, in the form of 
the class action waiver provision, that travels through contractual relation­
ships and dooms the class action device. Where class actions are based on 
some sort of contractual relationship, this toxin is quite lethal. Developed in 
the late 1 990s by marketers for one of the arbitral bodies, 13 among others, 14 
the waiver works in tandem with standard arbitration provisions to ensure 
that any claim against the corporate defendant may be asserted only in a 
one-on-one, nonaggregated arbitral proceeding. More virulent strains of the 
1 1 . DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION 
DILEMMAS: PURSUING PuBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 52-53 (2000). 
1 2 .  See infra Part I. 
1 3 .  See infra notes 1 20- 1 27 and accompanying text (charting the early development of  col­
lective action waivers generally, and role of the National Arbitration Forum specifically). 
1 4. See infra notes 1 28- 1 3 1  and accompanying text (reviewing allegations that major credit 
card companies and issuing banks played a significant and clandestine role in the development of 
collective action waivers). 
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clause force the would-be plaintiff to waive even her right to be represented 
as a passive, or absent, class member in the event some other injured person 
manages to commence a class proceeding. 
These provisions, which I term "collective action waivers,"15  still face 
important judicial challenges, which have the potential to significantly limit 
their scope. The first round of attempts by plaintiffs' lawyers to invalidate 
collective action waivers was rooted in state law unconscionability doctrine 
and allegations that the waivers were inconsistent with substantive federal 
statutes. 16 These arguments have met with failure everywhere except Cali­
fornia, which has proven hospitable to the unconscionability challenge. 17 
The plaintiffs ' lawyers, however, are not going down without a fight and 
are beginning to bring second-wave challenges to collective action waivers, 
which are subtler and more surgical than the broad state-law unconscion­
ability attack. For example, creative plaintiffs' lawyers are arguing that the 
collective action waiver 's implicit prohibition against cost-spreading across 
multiple claimants precludes plaintiffs from vindicating federal statutory 
rights in complex matters that would be expensive to litigate, at least where 
each plaintiff has relatively little at stake.18 On this theory, the anti-cost­
spreading feature should be treated no differently than mandatory cost­
splitting provisions, which current doctrine holds invalid where they would 
preclude the exercise of federal statutory rights. 19 The coercive imposition of 
collective action waivers by parties with market power has also been chal­
lenged under the Sherman Act. 20 It remains to be seen how much traction 
these second-wave challenges will find in combating the collective action 
waivers .  Certainly, the scope of these challenges is more limited than the 
broad first-wave challenges.21 
15 .  I use the term "collective action waivers" rather than "class action waivers" because 
these provisions, in their usual contemporary form, waive not only the right to participate in class 
actions, but also the right to participate in classwide arbitrations or to aggregate claims with others 
in any form of judicial or arbitral proceeding. 
1 6. See infra Section 11.C (discussing the successes and failures of "first wave" challenges to 
collective action waivers). 
1 7. See infra text accompanying notes 1 82-185 (discussing California cases voiding collec­
tive action waivers on unconscionability grounds). 
18 .  A likely test case for these theories is brewing in federal court in New York, where nu­
merous retailers are seeking to assert antitrust claims against American Express ("AmEx") as a 
class, notwithstanding the presence of broad collective action waivers in the standard AmEx mer­
chant agreement. As this Article goes to print, the matter is sub judice in In Re American Express 
Merchants' Litigation, 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003). 
1 9. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531  U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (finding that the party 
seeking to avoid arbitration "bears the burden of showing [that] the likelihood of incurring such 
costs" would prohibit that individual from pursuing her rights); see also Bradford v. Rockwell 
Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 55 1 (4th Cir. 2001 )  (finding that the party seeking to avoid 
arbitration has the burden of showing that the costs of the arbitration will deter her from bringing a 
claim in the arbitral forum and, as such, prohibit her from vindicating her statutory rights). 
20. See In Re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N. Y. Dec. 23, 2003). 
2 1 . The second-wave challenges apply only to claims alleging violations of federal statutory 
rights where each claimant has a relatively minor sum at stake in pursuing the action, such that the 
costs of instigating an individual arbitration far exceed the costs of class litigation. These challenges 
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Assuming the collective action waiver emerges more or less unscathed 
from the current round of judicial challenges, it is only a matter of time be­
fore these waivers metastasize throughout the body of corporate America 
and bar the majority of class actions as we know them. It is true that, to date, 
the collective action waiver has likely had only minimal penetration;22 early 
adopters include financial services companies, telephone and Internet firms, 
and a handful of other aggressive firms with a keen interest in avoiding class 
action liability. But I regard it as inevitable that firms will ultimately act in 
their economic best interests, and those interests dictate that virtually all 
companies will opt out of exposure to class action liability. Why wouldn't 
they?23 Once the waivers gain broader acceptance and recognition, it will 
become malpractice for corporate counsel not to include such clauses in 
consumer and other class-action-prone contracts. 
Ultimately, owing to new technologies and the emphatic j udicial em­
brace of arbitration over the past twenty years, there are few areas of class 
action law to which the collective action waiver will not extend. Technology 
has vastly broadened traditional notions of contract and acceptance. Any 
transaction that may be cemented with the click of a mouse is susceptible to 
a class action waiver.24 Judicial preferences for arbitration, meanwhile, have 
led courts to an unprecedented solicitude for unilateral "envelope-stuffer" 
amendments of adhesion contracts-for example, the unread notice stuffed 
in a consumer 's monthly bill stating that, by continuing to use her credit 
card, or her telephone, she agrees to arbitrate any dispute that may arise.25 
Increasingly, these unilateral notices are taking the form of mass emails, or 
even website postings, which have been held to support the imposition of 
arbitration provisions and even collective action waivers.26 
therefore could not succeed in a host of claims brought under state laws addressing the rights of 
consumers, employees, commercial transactions, and others. 
22. It is, of course, entirely possible that many companies have, in the very recent past, in­
cluded collective action waivers in their contracts. Unless those waivers are challenged in court on a 
motion to compel arbitration or otherwise surface during litigation, it is difficult to quantify just how 
many are out there. Still, it is my sense-given the still-high number of consumer and commercial 
class actions filed annually-that many (most?) companies have not yet written the waivers into 
their agreements with potential class members. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Exami­
nation of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 
(2004) (analyzing data on class actions filed over the past several decades and finding a recent up­
tick in class action litigation). 
23. See infra note 123 (concluding that most rational, well-informed economic actors will 
determine these waivers to be in their best interests). 
24. See infra Part Ill. See generally Donnie L. Kidd, Jr. & William H. Daughtrey, Jr., Adapt­
ing Contract Law to Accommodate Electronic Contracts: Overview and Suggestions, 26 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 215, 243 (2000). 
25. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitration clauses need not be signed to be enforce­
able. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
26. See, e.g. , Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 919 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (holding 
that credit card holders were bound by an arbitration clause contained in their monthly bill); see also 
Jean R. Stemlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Con­
sumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 831, 834-
35 (2002) ("[M]any companies simply use envelope stuffers, warranty provisions, or employee 
handbooks to specify the available procedural recourse. Other companies obtain a signature on a 
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One seemingly contract-free bastion of class action practice is securities 
fraud litigation-specifically, the paradigmatic Rule IOb-5 case where the 
plaintiff has purchased shares of the defendant issuer on the secondary mar­
ket. Without a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the issuing 
company, it would appear that there is no way for the issuer to impose an 
arbitration clause or a class action waiver. And yet even these actions may 
be susceptible to the waivers:  Is it not possible for a class action waiver to 
be effected by some form of publication notice-perhaps coupled with ac­
tual notice to all the exchanges and brokerage houses, and legends on stock 
certificates-so as to allow securities issuers also to opt out of class action 
exposure? Might courts not develop a doctrine that the waiver "travels with 
the stock"? Would such a rule be any more astonishing than the other devel­
opments here on our legal Mauritius? 
In the end, I do not think the real story of the contemporary class action 
is adequately told by the doctrinalists, the law and economics scholars or­
certainly-by the moralists. I think an accurate appreciation of the present 
and future of class action litigation requires a heavy dollop of legal realism. 
One needs to appreciate the evolutionary arms r ace that is afoot between 
entrenched corporate interests and entrepreneurial plaintiffs' lawyers. Schol­
ars and members of Congress are largely preoccupied with fine-tuning the 
rules governing the class action. Corporate lawyers, meanwhile, have plot­
ted its demise. 
My own view is that class actions-warts and all---do far more good 
than harm. I take it as beyond dispute that the threat of class action liability 
plays a vital role in deterring corporate wrongdoing. And while one might 
argue-as many scholars do--that class actions in contemporary practice 
may tend to overdeter, or that agency costs hamper the effectiveness of the 
class action device, I am aware of no serious argument that we should ditch 
class actions in their entirety. Everyone seems to agree that sound public 
policy requires collective litigation be available for small-claim plaintiffs 
who would not have the incentive or resources to remedy harms or deter 
wrongdoing in one-on-one proceedings.27 
In any event, class actions have to exist if we want to fix them. If com­
panies may render themselves impervious to the class action procedure 
simply by checking a box that says "I do not wish to be exposed to class 
actions," then-ultimately-all of the scholarly reform proposals will have 
been for naught. Accordingly, I would add to the heap of reform offerings 
credit card or employment application, a form filled out in a doctor's office, or a loan agreement. 
Sometimes the clauses are provided on-line, and 'accepted' by the customer who clicks 'enter.' ") 
(citations omitted); Caroline E. Mayer, Hidden in Fine Print: 'You Can't Sue Us', WASH. PosT, May 
22, 1999, at AO! (noting that American Express imposed arbitration clauses on its cardholders 
through a nondescript insert in monthly bills). 
27. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation Functions in 
Mass Ton Class Actions for Future loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1906 n.62 (2002) (noting the domi­
nant consensus among scholars and commentators is that the class action device helps to "correct 
the obvious asymmetrical litigation power" seen in " 'low stake' claims---<:ases involving loss that is 
large in the aggregate, but too small as incurred by each plaintiff for a competent attorney to con­
sider any single claim economically worth prosecuting"). 
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my own proposed amendment to Rule 23, which would simply provide that 
the procedures set forth in the rule may not be waived by a standard-form 
adhesion contract. 
But I am not holding my breath. Instead, I offer a dismal prediction of 
the near-total demise of the modem class action, organized as follows: 
INTRODUCTION ............ ..... ............. .. ..... . ................................................ 373 
I. THE DEMISE OF MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS ........................... 380 
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I. THE DEMISE OF MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS 
Mass tort class actions represent an early casualty in the shift of judicial 
attitudes against collective litigation activity in general, and the story of their 
demise may provide insight into the future of judicial treatment of other types 
of class actions. My project in this Part is not really a normative one: I find the 
doctrinal underpinnings of the cases that effectively ended "mass-class" to be 
perfectly coherent (albeit not outcome-determinative), and I regard the utilitar­
ian justifications offered by courts and scholars to reflect perfectly 
understandable policy choices (albeit choices made from a menu of opposing, 
equally understandable policy choices). Instead, I am interested in the very 
fact of the demise of mass-class. Not that I suppose, Ktibler-Ross-like,28 to 
discern universal stages in the death throes of once-thriving procedural vehi­
cles. Rather, I perceive that a Reagan-era judicial attitude adjustment 
animated the near disappearance of mass-class, and that this same basic ju­
dicial mindset may yet drive even more momentous developments in the law 
of class actions, as discussed in subsequent Parts.29 
Mass tort class actions never enjoyed much of a heyday. The prevalence 
of individual causation and other issues in tort claims augured poorly for the 
widespread use of class actions in mass torts from the get-go.30 Still, as col­
lective action litigation in general took off around the country in the 1 970s,3 1 
the use of class actions gained traction in the burgeoning mass tort field. 
Some inventive work by a handful of federal district judges in the late 1 970s 
and 1 980s momentarily portended a bright future. In fact, as late as the early 
1 990s, according to an influential RAND Institute study, tort claims ac­
counted for nearly a quarter of class action litigation.32 And yet, within a 
decade, commentators were chronicling the demise of the mass tort class 
action and arguing about whether there was any role at all for mass tort class 
actions going forward.33 
What happened? 
28. Elisabeth Ktibler-Ross, in her famous work, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969), described 
the five stages of grief as denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. 
29. I do not imagine this assertion is terribly controversial. The attitude shift I discuss in this 
Section is part and parcel of a more general movement away from the principles that animated the 
Warren Court's jurisprudence, the Great Society's legislative agenda, and the brief moment in U.S. 
socio-political thought when issues of equality, access, and opportunity were paramount. See, e.g. , 
Myriam Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . .  It's Still Moving!, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 143 (2003). See generally infra Part III. 
30. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("A 'mass accident' resulting in 
injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood 
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would be 
present, affecting the individuals in different ways."). 
31. See Gilles, supra note 29, at 150. 
32. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
33. See, e.g. , Coffee, supra note 4; Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of 
the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85 ( 1997). 
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A. The Short Story of "Mass-Class" 
As mass tort cases began to inundate the federal system in the 1 970s and 
'80s,34 the federal district courts were faced with a daunting challenge: they 
needed to find ways to dispose of tens of thousands of cases efficiently 
without compromising existing legal rules designed to protect the interests 
of individual litigants. Class actions were not an obvious place to look: in 
amending Rule 23(b) in 1 966, the Advisory Committee had warned against 
the use of the class action device in mass tort cases because of the likely 
predominance of individual questions. "In these circumstances," the 
Committee cautioned, "an action conducted nominally as a class action 
would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried."35 
So instead of pushing the class action envelope, district judges turned 
first to the familiar common law principle of issue preclusion. Particularly 
after the Supreme Court gave its blessings to the nonmutual offensive use of 
collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,36 it became possible to 
argue that if one plaintiff managed to establish a defendant's liability on a 
common issue-for example, whether the defendant failed to warn workers 
about the risks of asbestos exposure-then future claimants would be able to 
avail themselves of that finding without having to relitigate the issue.37 
A pioneer of these efforts was Judge Parker. Faced with thousands of as­
bestos lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas38 and having heard identical 
liability evidence in case after case, Judge Parker turned in the early 1 980s 
to collateral estoppel to bar defendants from relitigating particular liability 
issues that had been decided against them at trial. 39 For example, having 
34. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23 ("The 1980s saw the rise of a new form of 
litigation, the mass-tort suit. Consumers of drugs and medical devices, and workers and others ex­
posed to toxic substances, sued manufacturers for injuries allegedly associated with these 
products."). 
35. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes. 
36. 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979) ("[Offensive collateral estoppel] has the dual purpose of pro­
tecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy 
and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation."). 
37. Some judges apparently preferred consolidation of cases under Rule 42 to issue preclu­
sion. See Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tux. L. REv. 1587, 1599 (1995) (discuss­
ing instances in which judges consolidated thousands of cases pursuant to Rule 42). 
38. The Eastern District of Texas was a hotbed of asbestos litigation in the 1980s and '90s; 
in 1986, for example, over 700 asbestos cases were on the docket. Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and 
Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429, 434 (1986). By 1990, "one out of every three civil cases 
filed in the Eastern District of Texas was an asbestos personal injury claim." Deborah R. Hensler, As 
Time Goes by: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 Tux. L. REV. 1899, 1900 (2002). 
This led one commentator to describe the district as the "fertile crescent of asbestos litigation." 
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV . 659, 660 (1989). 
39. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D. Tex. 1981); see also 
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 11, at 23 (commenting that judges, particularly in asbestos cases, found 
themselves "trying the issues that the cases have in common over and over again in individual tri­
als"); McGovern, supra note 38, at 662-63 ("Judge Parker ruled that offensive collateral estoppel, or 
in the alternative, stare decisis or judicial notice, precluded a defendant's future assertion that it was 
not liable for asbestos related injuries."). 
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tried the so-called "state-of-the-art" defense,40 Judge Parker applied collat­
eral estoppel to bar the defendant from litigating that defense in each new 
asbestos trial. This approach, naturally, eased the congestion on the court's 
docket and, not insignificantly, held out promise that terminally ill asbestos 
plaintiffs might see resolution of their cases during their abbreviated life­
times. 
Presaging a recurring pattern that would come to characterize mass tort 
litigation, the Fifth Circuit reversed this attempt by the district court to 
aggregate and streamline litigation.41 On this occasion, the court held Judge 
Parker's use of collateral estoppel was inappropriate because, among other 
reasons, there existed prior "inconsistent verdicts" from other courts on the 
same liability issues.42 Under the Fifth Circuit's ruling, if a defendant has 
managed to secure a favorable verdict on a particular issue-such as the 
state-of-the-art defense-then a plaintiff's verdict from a subsequent jury on 
the same issue will not be entitled to preclusive effect.43 This reasoning 
effectively dooms issue preclusion in mass torts,44 where the very volume of 
cases makes it inevitable that some jury, somewhere, will decide a given 
issue in favor of the defense. 
At this point, from the perspective of the federal district j udge swamped 
with mass tort cases, the class action device surely merited another look.45 
And so, in the early 1 980s, inventive federal district judges began to find 
ways to use Rule 23 to address the mass torts of the day, including Agent 
Orange, asbestos, tobacco, DES, Dalkon Shield, and a host of others.46 
40. Defendants in asbestos cases inevitably raised a state-of-the-art defense, claiming that 
recovery should be denied because the hazards of asbestos were unknowable at the time of expo­
sure. See, e.g., Jack Berman, Case Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: The 
Function of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 93, 105 
(1984). 
41. Hardy, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). 
42. Id. at 346 ("[T]he Court noted that collateral estoppel is improper and 'unfair' to a de­
fendant 'if the judgment relied upon as a basis for the estoppel is itself inconsistent with one or 
more previous judgments in favor of the defendant.' ") (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 
U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979)). 
43. Id. at 347. 
44. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Problems in Complex Litigation, 10 REv. Lma. 213, 222 
(1991) ("[T]he federal appellate courts have effectively eliminated issue preclusion as a means of 
preventing the relitigation of duplicative claims, except in the narrowest of circumstances. These 
doctrines have frustrated the ability of federal courts to deal with mass tort cases in an aggregative 
fashion, thus requiring the repetitive adjudication of thousands of similar claims.") (footnote omit­
ted). 
45. See HENSLER ET AL, supra note 11, at 24 (noting that "by the mid-1980s . . .  as the num­
ber of mass tort cases mounted, trial and appellate courts had begun" to consider the use of class 
actions to streamline and manage their dockets). 
46. Up to this point in the story-nearly two decades after the adoption of Rule 23-
plaintiffs who had sought class status in mass tort cases had been almost universally rejected. See, 
e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo. 1982), rev'd, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) (lake pollution); Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713 
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (DES); Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (negligent surgery 
in veteran's hospital); Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (asbestos expo-
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Judge Parker, having been rebuffed in his other efforts to deal with the larg­
est asbestos caseload in the country, certified a class under Rule 23(b)(3) to 
try the defendants' state-of-the-art defense.47 Cautioning that the class would 
likely be decertified at a later point in the proceedings for adjudication of 
individual issues, Parker nonetheless believed that a one-shot trial on the 
primary defense would save significant time and money.48 This time, the 
Fifth Circuit affirmed, observing in a 1 986 decision that litigating this "issue 
consistently consume[s] substantial resources in every asbestos trial, and 
[that] the evidence in each case [is] either identical or virtually so . . . .  "49 
Also in the early 1 980s, Judges George Pratt and Jack Weinstein of the 
Eastern District of New York certified a nationwide class of Vietnam veter­
ans alleging injuries resulting from their exposure to dioxin-a.k.a. "Agent 
Orange"-during the war.50 While the court was certainly mindful of the 
inherently individual causation and damages issues in mass-exposure cases, 
it certified under Rule 23(b)(3) to resolve the threshold government­
contractor defense "that impact[s] equally on every plaintiff's claim."5 1 The 
court noted that "later stages of this litigation, especially those concerned 
with individual causation and damages, 'may require reconsideration' of the 
certification."52 
A similar tack was taken by Judge Williams in the Dalkon Shield 
litigation,53 where he sua sponte certified a nationwide class of women 
solely for the purposes of trying the issue of punitive damages liability.54 
Putting aside, or putting off, individual questions of injury causation and 
damages, Judge Williams reasoned that individual suits were "neither 
sure); Snyder v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (Love Canal 
toxic waste). 
47. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 109 F.R.D. 269, 282 (E.D. Tex. 1985), ajf'd, 782 F.2d 468 
(5th Cir. 1986). Judge Parker certified the class and then ordered an immediate interlocutory appeal, 
which was not then required under Rule 23(b), so that the Fifth Circuit could review his determina­
tion before the class action proceeded. 
48. Id. 
49. Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986). 
50. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN 
THE COURTS (1986). The case was consolidated by the Multidistrict Litigation Panel in 1979, pre­
liminarily certified by Judge George Pratt in 1980, and finally certified as a damages and limited 
fund class action by Judge Jack Weinstein in 1983. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN 
MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDAT IONS, AND OTHER MULTI­
PARTY DEVICES 8-18 (1995). 
51. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
52. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 722 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
53. Two million Dalkon Shield contraceptive devices were inserted in women in the United 
States between 1970 and 1974, when the product was removed from the market. Some users sus­
tained serious injuries such as "uterine perforations, infections, ectopic and uterine pregnancies, 
spontaneous abortions, fetal injuries and birth defects, sterility, and hysterectomies." In re N. Dist. of 
Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig, 693 F.2d 847, 848-49 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 1171 (1983); see also RONALD J. BACJGAL, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD 
CONTROVERSY 12-13 (1990). 
54. In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. 
Cal. 1981), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983). 
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sensible, nor fair to those plaintiffs last to queue at the courthouse door­
possibly to face no recovery against a defendant with its pockets turned out, 
due either to the effect of a barrage of lawsuits, or to its refuge in Chapter XI 
bankruptcy proceedings . . . .  "55 Although the Ninth Circuit later reversed class 
certification, partly on the grounds that neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendants had sought to try these claims under Rule 23(b)(3),56 
commentators widely applauded Judge Williams' creativity in using the 
procedural tools at his disposal.57 
The courts in all of these cases applied legal rules in a plausible fashion 
to reach results they believed just or efficient. These decisions reflect identi­
fiable values, including a concern with fairness to plaintiffs such as the 
mesothelioma victims likely to die before their cases may be heard, or the 
Dalkon Shield victims who, in the absence of collective litigation, would 
have likely found a destitute defendant by the time their individual actions 
were called. Driven by these values and concerns-these moral intuitions­
Judges Parker, Weinstein, Williams, and others58 construed Rule 23 and re­
lated doctrine in a way that allowed collective action.59 What these courts 
did, really, was to certify classes to try issues, as opposed to cases.6f) It was 
obvious to these j udges that individualized issues such as injury-causation 
and damages would require decertification at a later stage or some other 
such procedural construction. But they saw no doctrinal problem with this 
approach. After all, Rule 23(c)(4)(A) provides that "[w]hen appropriate 
. . .  an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect 
55. Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 332 
(1983). At the time of class certification, Judge Williams determined that defendant A.H. Robins's 
assets totaled $280 million and that it faced potential liabilities equal to or greater than that amount. 
Dallam Shield, 526 F. Supp. at 893; see also Richard L. Marcus, Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of 
Megacases on Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REv 457, 485 (2002) ("With the bankruptcy filing of Man­
ville in 1982, the true prospective dimensions of [mass] asbestos litigation began to dawn on 
many."). 
56. Dalkon Shield, 693 F.2d at 850-51. The plaintiffs and their counsel in the Dalkon Shield 
litigation actually opposed class certification. 526 F. Supp. at 890; see also Stephen C. Yeazell, 
Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 58. 
57. See, e.g. , Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2009, 
2015 (2000) ("Judge Williams was right about judicial innovation . . .  the courts have been 're­
markably inventive' in addressing the problems of mass tort litigation with existing procedural 
tools."). Judge Williams himself later suggested that he was right to certify the class: "the inequities 
and shortcomings of the present system require that we judges work in an innovative fashion." Wil­
liams, supra note 55, at 325. 
58. See e.g. , Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(upholding district court Judge Robert J. Kelleher's certification of a class of common stock share­
holders, finding the judge had "determined to the best of his ability the course the litigation would 
follow") ; Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382 (D. Mass. 1979) (District Judge Skinner certified a 
class of women in Massachusetts who were exposed to DES in utero). 
59. See McGovern, supra note 38, at 1882. 
60. See Williams, supra note 55, at 326--27 ("One important, but both underutilized and 
overlooked, aspect of Rule 23 's repertoire provides the possibility of class adjudication not as an 
entire case, but limited to one or more issues common to a group of cases."). 
December 2005] Opting Out of Liability 385 
to particular issues."61 Rule 23(c)(4)(A) may be opaque and underused,62 
but commentators have long noted the general applicability of issue class 
actions to mass torts,63 and it seems quite possible that such issue class ac­
tions were exactly what a number of judges had in mind in certifying classes 
during the late 1 980s and early 1 990s.64 
Their moment, however, was short-lived, as the judicial values animat­
ing these mass tort class certifications ran headlong into a different set of 
judicial values, epitomized by Chief Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh 
Circuit in the watershed Rhone-Poulenc case.65 Brought by a class compris­
ing 1 20,000 hemophiliacs exposed to AIDS-infected blood, the case 
concerned the defendant's widely used blood-screening and extraction 
product.66 The district court certified a class solely to try the issue of defen­
dant's negligence; at the end of the case, the jury would issue a special 
verdict on negligence and, if the plaintiffs won, individual class members 
would fan out to courtrooms across the country to try causation, damages, 
and any other individual issues.67 
On a writ of mandamus, the Seventh Circuit decertified the class. Writ­
ing for the panel, Judge Posner's focus was on the fairness of the procedures 
to the defendant who "might easily be facing $25 billion in potential liabil­
ity (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll 
these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to 
61. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c)(4)(A); see also 7B CHARLES ALAN W RIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790, at 271 (2d ed. 1986) ("The theory of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) is that the 
advantages and economies of adjudicating issues that are common to the entire class on a represen­
tative basis should be secured even though other issues in the case may have to be litigated 
separately by each class member."). 
62. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1475, 1499 (2005) ("The 'issues class' provision of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) has been infrequently invoked, 
perhaps due to uncertainty as to how it is to be 'construed and applied' in conjunction with, or as a 
substitute for, the predominance analysis of Rule 23(b)(3)." (footnote omitted)); Laura J. Hines, 
Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 717 (2003) ("[Rule 23(c)(4)(A)] 
clearly envisions that a court may conduct a common class trial of 'particular issues,' but beyond 
that its meaning is opaque."). 
63. See, e.g. , Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certi­
fication of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 263 ("[C]ases that do 
not otherwise meet the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be certified 
as issue classes."). 
64. Cabraser, supra note 62, at 1499 ("[The issue class action] standard is more flexible, 
enabling courts to examine the circumstances of a particular case to fashion the most efficient path 
toward resolution [because] [t]he rule simply requires that the issue proposed for class treatment be 
of 'central' importance to the disposition of the case."). 
65. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 51F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995). 
66. Wadleigh v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 410, 413-14 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The 
defendants' products extracted and concentrated proteins from donated blood through a process 
called "fractionating" for more effective treatment of hemophilia. The plaintiffs alleged that defen­
dants failed to properly screen donated blood for the AIDS virus, resulting in injuries to the plaintiff 
class. 
67. Id. , 157 F.R.D. at 422-23. 
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settle."68 Clearly disinclined for this core reason to allow the certification to 
stand, Judge Posner then offered other reasons for decertifying in this case, 
including: (i) the difficulty of applying numerous states' negligence laws in 
a single proceeding; and (ii) the observation that plaintiffs had lost a major­
ity of the individual trials against the defendant to date, suggesting that a 
classwide showdown had not been earned.69 
Judge Posner's opinion swiftly became the model for other appellate 
courts in decertifying mass tort classes.70 Most famously, in Castano v. 
American Tobacco Co. , the Fifth Circuit decertified "the largest class action 
ever," consisting of current, former, and deceased smokers and their fami­
lies.71 Again, the concern over the rights of defendants in mass tort class 
actions was paramount: 
In the context of mass tort class actions, certification dramatically affects 
the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies and strengthens the 
number of unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it more 
likely that a defendant will be found liable and results in significantly 
higher damage awards. In addition to skewing trial outcomes, class certifi­
cation creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas 
individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict pre­
sents too high a risk, even when the probability of an adverse jud�ment is 
low. These settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.7 
Here again, plaintiffs sought only to try class-common factual questions. 
Like Rhone-Poulenc, the Castano court found that differences in state law 
68. Rhone-Poulenc, 5 1  F.3d at 1298; see also George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substan· 
tive Controls of Mass Tort Class Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 52 1 ,  533 (1997) ("More openly than in 
any other opinion, [the Rhone-Poulenc] court is concerned about the unfair pressure toward settle­
ment that follows from class certification."). 
69. Rhone-Poulenc, 5 1  F.3d at 1299 (noting that at the time of the district court's certifica­
tion, thirteen individual cases had been tried, with twelve defendant-verdicts returned). 
As one commentator has noted, Judge Posner was in fact so concerned about the be-all and 
end-all position that defendants found themselves in after a certification of a class in this era when 
the Federal Rules did not yet provide for appellate review of certification decisions that he issued 
the extraordinary writ of mandamus in order "to adjudicate the case without completely abandoning 
his jurisdiction." Stephen D. Susman, Class Actions: Consumer Sword Turned Corporate Shield?, 
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2 (2003). The Federal Rules were amended in 1996 to provide an inter· 
locutory appeal of class certification determinations. See FED. R. C1v. P. 23(f). 
70. See, e.g., Cabraser, supra note 62, at 148 1  (noting that the "Rhone-Poulenc decision has 
been vastly influential in all aspects of class action jurisprudence," and in particular, "its 'free­
market' attitude toward the maturation of mass torts through repetitive trials in multiple jurisdictions 
has held sway across the country"). 
7 1 .  84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). The complaint alleged that the defendant tobacco companies 
fraudulently failed to inform consumers that nicotine is addictive and manipulated the level of nico­
tine in cigarettes to sustain their addictive nature. Id. at 737. 
72. Id. at 746 (citations omitted); see also Cabraser, supra note 62, at 1481 ("[The Rhone· 
Poulenc decision] was avowedly procorporate. [The court] voiced the concern, found nowhere in the 
Federal Rules, that a classwide trial on liability that the defendant lost would place it into bank· 
ruptcy, or force it to settle, short of trial, because the risk of loss, rather than or in addition to the risk 
presented by the merits, would force a corporate decision to surrender. Since such pressure would 
not be present had the company faced only a series of scattered individual trials-with lower conse· 
quences of defeat, and repeated opportunities for victory-class actions therefore comprise, in the 
Rhone-Poulenc analysis, a form of 'blackmail.' "). 
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and among plaintiffs failed Rule 23 's predominance requirement. And like 
Rhone-Poulenc, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that plaintiffs in previous to­
bacco cases had met with little success73 and essentially did not have enough 
notches on their belts to warrant a winner-takes-all shootout at the OK Cor­
ral.74 And, again, like Rhone-Poulenc, the court here was mainly concerned 
about the power issues and the pressure that certification placed on defen­
dants. 75 
By this point, Judge Posner's snowball was well on its way down the 
hill. The Castano decertification was followed, in quick succession, by the 
Sixth Circuit's decertification of a class involving penile implants,76 the 
Ninth Circuit's decertification of medical products liability classes,77 and the 
Third Circuit's decertification of an asbestos class.78 Finally, the Supreme 
Court got into the act, rejecting a prepackaged settlement deal in which 
73. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) ;  Cippolone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
74. The theory endorsed by the Castano and Rhone-Poulenc courts has come to be known as 
the "maturity theory" of mass torts, first developed by Francis McGovern. McGovern, supra note 
38; see also Castano, 84 F.3d at 747 ("[A] mass tort cannot be properly certified without a prior 
track record of trials from which the district court can draw the information necessary to make the 
predominance and superiority analysis required by rule 23. This is because certification of an imma­
ture tort results in a higher than normal risk that the class action may not be superior to individual 
adjudication."); Rhone-Poulenc, 5 1  F.3d at 1 300 (concluding that the claim against the defendants 
had not reached a level of "consensus or maturing of judgment" that would follow from further 
individual claims being filed and won); David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass 
Tort Cases: Lessons From a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695, 7 1 0  ( 1989) ("[T]he maturity 
prerequisite generates years of redundant litigation, diverting enormously valuable party, lawyer, 
expert, and judicial resources from other productive undertakings."). 
75. Castano, 84 F.3d at 746 ("In the context of mass tort class actions, certification dramati­
cally affects the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies and strengthens the number of 
unmeritorious claims. Aggregation of claims also makes it more likely that a defendant will be 
found liable and results in significantly higher damage awards. In addition to skewing trial out­
comes, class certification creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas 
individual trials would not. The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk, even 
when the probability of an adverse judgment is low. These settlements have been referred to as 
judicial blackmail." (internal citations omitted)). 
76. In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1 085-86 (6th Cir. 1996). The court decertified this 
nationwide class, at least in part because the trial judge had failed to rigorously examine whether the 
negligence laws of all fifty states were sufficiently similar to allow class treatment, on the grounds 
that "[i]f more than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, the district judge would face an im­
possible task of instructing a jury on the relevant law, yet another reason why class certification 
would not be the appropriate course of action." Id. at 1085. 
77. Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1 227, 1 235 (9th Cir. 1996). While the appellate 
court rejected Judge Posner's concerns about the undue pressure toward settlement incurred at the 
certification stage, it nonetheless concluded that individual issues predominated over class issues 
and that substantive differences in state law were inadequately analyzed. Id. at 1 233. As one com­
mentator notes: 
The [Ninth Circuit's] rejection of the Seventh Circuit's approach is interesting, however, be­
cause the court in Valentino gives much greater attention to an explanation of the Seventh 
Circuit's concerns about pressure toward settlement and placing the fate of an industry in the 
hands of a single jury than it does to its conclusion that certification is inappropriate on 
grounds of lack of predominance. 
Priest, supra note 68, at 534. 
78. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 6 1 0  (3d Cir. 1996). 
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plaintiffs and defendants agreed to certify an asbestos class for settlement 
purposes only.79 Once again, the refusal to certify was driven, in part, by 
concerns with "fairness" to the defendants, given the coercive settlement 
power of a certified class proceeding.80 And once again, the Court's action 
found doctrinal cover in the notion that the predominance of common issues 
is undercut by the purported difficulty of applying allegedly disparate state 
laws-a rationale that has become central in the majority of these decertifi­
cation cases. 8
1 
At this point, courts and commentators appear to agree: the mass tort 
class action is dead as a doornail. 82 The Ninth Circuit has postulated that a 
case having certain attributes could thread the needle, but that case has yet 
to appear.83 And so, with all of this as background, I wonder: what does the 
short history of mass tort class actions portend for the future of collective 
litigation generally? 
B. The Lesson of Mass-Class 
The doctrinal underpinnings of the decertification cases are plausible but 
shaky. To say the least, the cases are not driven by doctrine; the results are 
not compelled by legal rules. While the drafters of the modem Rule 23 were 
justified in doubting that the legal requirements of the rule would be met in 
the typical mass torts case, given the inevitable individual issues of causa­
tion and damages, those concerns went by the wayside with the advent of 
the issue-specific class action pioneered by Judge Parker and others.
84 
The remaining legal-doctrinal objections are fairly weak. It is simply not 
true that mass tort cases enmesh courts in "individual" issues by requiring 
the application of (allegedly) divergent state laws. First, the relevant state 
79. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (vacating class settlement for 
failure to meet commonality requirements of Rule 23(b)). 
80. George Priest makes a similar point when he notes that "lurking beneath the surface" in 
the decertification cases "is the fear that certification alone will be determinative of the dispute and 
unfairly determinative if the underlying substantive merit . . .  is low." Priest, supra note 68, at 523. 
81. See, e.g. , Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 742 n.15 (5th Cir. 1996) ("We find it difficult to fathom 
how common issues could predominate in this case when variations in state law are thoroughly 
considered."); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); Emig v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 184 F.R.D. 379 (D. Kan. 1998) (court determined that because multiple states' laws 
applied, the class was uncertifiable; plaintiffs limited the class to those governed by Kansas law). 
82. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 CoLUM. L. REV. 370, 372-74 (2000) (describing Amchem 
and Oniz as having "essentially frozen the development of the class action"); S. Elizabeth Gibson, A 
Response to Professor Resnik: Will this Vehicle Pass Inspection?, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2095, 2097-98 
(2000) ("While Amchem and Oniz may not sound the death knell for mass tort class action settle­
ments, the decisions certainly increase the difficulty of getting either type of class action certified by 
a district court and ultimately approved on appeal."). 
83. See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 1996). 
84. Some commentators have argued that issue-specific class actions are not sanctioned by 
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) unless the entire case meets the common-predominance requirement of 23(b)(3). 
See Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L. REV. 567 (2004). 
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tort laws are generally not terribly divergent.85 But second, in any event, the 
application of divergent states'  laws to common facts hardly requires a trial 
of individual issues; it requires the trial of several groups of common issues. 
There is certainly no doctrinal impediment to such a procedure; indeed, 
Rule 23(c)(4) specifically provides for the establishment of subclasses and 
the trial of issues common to the class.86 
A more compelling, rule-based objection to most mass tort class certifi­
cations lies in the "manageability" requirement of Rule 23(b ). Having 
multiple subclasses, for example, may not be the most manageable or effi­
cient solution for an overworked district court. But sometimes it surely is. 
There is a ring of pretext, not to mention chutzpah, in an appellate panel 
relying on manageability to reverse a Judge Parker, or a Judge Weinstein, or 
any district judge who is fashioning innovative procedures precisely because 
he is seeking to find ways to manage his docket in the face of an avalanche 
of mass tort filings. 
No, something else is going on here, and Judge Posner has told us ex­
actly what it is: it is a j udicial empathy for the complaint of corporate 
defendants that large class actions present a great deal of pressure to settle 
cases.87 Many commentators, unsurprisingly, have picked up on what they 
perceive to be the outcome-driven nature of the judge-made rules restricting 
mass tort class certification.88 More interestingly, the "political-policy" un­
derpinnings of this case law have not gone unnoticed by some district court 
85. At least two courts have certified nationwide state-law class actions where the law of all 
fifty states was implicated. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Copley 
Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995). Both of these cases were decided before the recent 
wave of decertifications discussed in this Part, but remain relevant as examples of claimants and 
courts willing to do the hard work of looking at and comparing the laws of a large number of juris­
dictions. See Castano. 84 F.3d at 743 (decertifying class in part because the "surveys provided by 
the plaintiffs failed to discuss. in any meaningful way. how the court could deal with variations in 
state law"). Of course. it is possible that the plaintiffs today must meet a much higher standard in 
order to certify a nationwide state-law class action-and that even the most minute nuances in state 
laws may doom any such effort. See. e.f{ . •  Chin v. Chrysler Corp .. 182 F.R.D. 448. 458 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(refusing to certify class even where plaintiffs provided a detailed appendix of the variations in state 
laws); In re Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint Litig., 182 F.R.D. 2 14. 222 (E.D. La. 1998) ("fPlroposed 
.iurv charges and interrogatories fall far short of addressing the nuances in state law which must be 
captured in any jury charge that does not invite reversal on appeal."). See generally Ryan Patrick 
Phair, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem " in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 835 (2000). 
86. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 8 15, 856 ( 1999) (in decertifying a class of 
asbestos-exposed workers, the Court ruled that its decision in Amchem had made it "obvious" that a 
class encompassing both presently injured and future claimants "requires division" into well-aligned 
subclasses); see also Hines, supra note 62, at 7 16-17; Romberg, supra note 63, at 297. 
87. Corporate counsel constantly complain of the pressure that class action certification 
places on them. As one noted insurance defense attorney argued, "[T]he system is broken. The class 
action device is not meant to be used to force a settlement award that is disproportionate to what 
would be achieved if someone actually had to litigate their case on its own merits. The device is out 
of whack when used in this context." Lawyers Present Pros, Cons of Class Action Suits, CLASS Ac­
TION REP., Oct. 18, 2004, available at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/041018.mbx (quoting 
James R. Carroll, a partner with the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP). 
88. See, e.g. , Hines, supra note 84, at 580; Susman, supra note 69; see also Mary J. Davis, 
Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157 ( 1998). 
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judges. As district judge Arthur Spiegel wrote, in a decision certifying a 
mass products class and refusing to follow Castano and Rhone-Poulenc: 
Recently, several Circuit Courts have been highly critical of the use of 
class actions in mass tort and product liability cases. While we recognize 
the difficulties inherent in diversity based-class [sic] actions as outlined by 
the Circuit Courts, we continue to believe that class action provides the 
fairest, most efficient and economical means of dealing with these types of 
cases . . . .  
We also strongly disagree with those Circuit Courts which have al­
lowed their apparent economic biases to influence their interpretation of 
the requirements of Rule 23. 89 
Noting that the courts in Castano and Rhone-Poulenc were moved by 
the observation that mass-class "certification dramatically affects the stakes 
for defendants," Judge Spiegel made the point that the stakes are equally 
affected by a refusal to certify: 
[D]enying class certification makes it less likely defendants will be found 
liable or responsible for lower damage awards . . . .  Plaintiffs in individual 
actions will have to bear a greater share of the cost and risk for maintain­
ing their action as compared to plaintiffs in a class action. Often an 
individual action pits a single plaintiff relying on his or her own resources 
to fund the litigation against the vast resources of a large manufacturer and 
the large law firms which represents [sic] it. 
Obviously, the procedural rules affect the outcome of litigation. These 
Circuit Courts seemed to ignore the essence of Rule 23 because of their 
philosophical disagreement with the effects of Rule 23.90 
Whether or not current mass tort class action doctrine is "correct,"91 the 
conclusion here is that a powerful judicial attitude has taken hold that por­
tends poorly for class actions. Discomfort with the settlement pressure 
exerted by class actions has led courts to decertify Rule 23(b)(3) damages 
classes wherever current doctrine permits. And thus far, the cases most vul­
nerable to this analysis have appeared in the area of mass tort, where 
jurisdiction is founded on diversity, and where the presence of state law is­
sues and choice-of-law problems has provided at least some doctrinal basis 
for decertification. But recently-and here I return to my main thesis-there 
has appeared on the scene a vehicle uniquely suited to allow predisposed 
jurists to thwart collective litigation in the non-tort sector of class action 
practice. All else being equal, this vehicle-the collective action waiver­
should anticipate a warm judicial reception. 
89. In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., 1 72 F.R.D. 27 1 ,  275 (S.D. Ohio 1 997). 
90. Id. at 276; see also Cabraser, supro note 62, at 1480 ("Utterly absent from [Judge Pos­
ner's] diatribe against class certification was any recognition that the victims had corresponding 
rights. Indeed, Rhone-Poulenc and its progeny exhibited no consciousness that consigning common 
issues to individual adjudication denies due process to the victims of mass wrongs."). 
9 1 .  For a more thorough critique of the case law surrounding mass tort class action certifica­
tion, see generally Hines, supro note 62. 
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II. THE COLLECTIVE ACTION W AIYER 
In the multifaceted battle over class actions, entrenched corporate inter­
ests and equally entrenched plaintiffs' lawyers and interest groups have 
pursued competing legislative reform agendas, have pressed competing doc­
trinal arguments in court and have offered competing policy justifications in 
the scholarly and popular literature to support their positions. The dynamics 
of this multifront battle are mirrored throughout the law, as the same two 
sets of belligerents are squared off in fights up and down the substantive and 
procedural landscape over medical malpractice, asbestos, securities litiga­
tion, arbitration, and scores of other issues, each with legislative, litigation­
strategic, and policy-theoretical dimensions. 
For a variety of reasons, direct efforts in courts and legislatures to re­
strict class actions have met with very limited success. The hugely 
successful attack on mass tort class actions, first of all, has proven not to be 
exportable to other areas of class action practice. Outside of torts, one will 
rarely encounter in class cases the knotty issues of overlapping or conflict­
ing state laws that Judges Posner and others relied upon to limit class 
certifications. Most class actions are founded on federal questions, such as 
federal consumer, civil rights, antitrust, and securities statutes. And any con­
tract forming the basis of a putative class action-for example, franchise 
agreements or insurance contracts-will invariably contain a choice of law 
provision, and thus sidestep the conflicts problems that provide the doctrinal 
(if not the animating) rationale for Rhone-Poulenc and related cases. 
Direct legislative reform efforts have also proven unsuccessful.92 There 
have been some dramatic proposals, such as the Carter administration's at­
tempt to create "private attorney general standing" under an amended Rule 
23,9 or Senator Jon Kyl's 2003 bill to prohibit plaintiffs' lawyers from re­
ceiving fees based on a percentage of recovery in large class actions,94 but 
they have been overwhelmingly rejected.95 For the most part, legislative ef­
forts by true believers on both sides have given way to bland, incrementalist 
bills such as the recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act,96 which creates 
92. See, e.g . . Thomas Merton Woods, Note, Wielding the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solu­
tions for Class Action Jurisdictional Reform, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 507, 509 n.21 (2000) (reviewing 
past failed legislative class action jurisdictional proposals). 
93. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 1 1 , at 21 (discussing the Carter administration pro­
posal). 
94. See Marcia Coyle, Times Five: Bolstered by High Fees in Tobacco Suits, Senate Bill 
Caps Hourly Pay in Class Actions, DAILY Bus. REV. (Palm Beach), May 20, 2003, at A9 (reporting 
on proposal by Senators Ky! and Cornyn to limit contingency fees earned by lawyers in suits result­
ing in settlements or judgments of $ 1 00 million or more). 
95. Somewhat more successful are state-by-state efforts to tighten restrictions on class certi­
fication. See AJG CEO Still Has Hopes that Ton Reform Will Pass, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Sept. 8, 2004 
(reporting that Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Ohio, and Texas have recently 
enacted legislation that would make it more difficult to bring class actions in state court). 
96. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") provides that: 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in contro­
versy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class 
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federal jurisdiction for nondiverse state law class actions implicating $5 mil­
lion or more. 97 Whatever one feels about the merits of this legislation, it is 
probably nothing to get exercised about98 (unless one believes that well­
connected plaintiffs' lawyers are routinely "hometowning" corporate defen­
dants in state court class actions around the country-a proposition based on 
anecdote rather than evidence).99 
However, while the multifront battle concerning class actions has failed to 
produce a clear victor, the defenders of corporate interests have enjoyed 
complete and total victory in the late-twentieth-century showdown over 
action in which any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any de­
fendant. 
28 U.S.C. § 1 332(d)(2) (2005). CAFA essentially expands diversity jurisdiction to incorporate non­
federal-question class actions. Christopher Whalen, Victory at Hand for GOP Tort Reform?, INSIGHT 
ON NEWS, Feb. 3-16, 2004, at 27. Critics believe that CAFA will have negative effects on collective 
action litigation, as "many cases will wind up not being brought because federal judges have been 
constrained by a series of legal precedents from considering large class actions that involve varying 
laws of different states." Stephen Labaton, Senate Approves Measure to Curb Big Class Actions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1 1 , 2005, at A l .  
97. P rior to the enactment of CAFA, there were a number of other proposals to federalize the 
class action mechanism. In 1 999, for example, Representative Robert Goodlatte of Virginia intro­
duced the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act, which would have eliminated the complete 
diversity requirement and allowed judges to consolidate individual claims in order to meet the 
amount in controversy requirement. 145 CONG. REC. El026 (daily ed. May 19, 1 999) (statement of 
Rep. Goodlatte, introducing H.R. 1 875). According to one commentator, "The motivating force 
behind this bill was the fear of class actions 'flooding into certain state courts.' In particular, Good­
latte feared state court favoritism toward local lawyers when facing off against out-of-state 
corporations" tipped the scales. Susman, supra note 69, at 14-15 (footnote omitted). 
98. Susman, supra note 69, at 16 (noting that the Class Action Fairness Act is not "all that 
important" because while "generally premised on the notion that state courts are more conducive to 
class action practice than federal courts," and "are recklessly biased and need to be cabined," the 
author notes that the problem isn't  that "state courts are inappropriately 'friendly,' but that federal 
courts are comparatively hostile"). But see Robert S. Whitman, The Class Action Fairness Act: A 
Six-Month Assessment, N.Y. L.J. at 4, Aug. 23, 2005 (noting that while it is still too early to "draw 
reliable conclusions about the effect of' CAFA, "the few cases decided thus far suggest that defen­
dants view the act-and particularly its expansion of federal court jurisdiction-as a welcome 
development in the defense of class and mass actions"). 
99. See H.R. REP. No. 108-144, at 13 (2003) ("[A] growing recognition among plaintiffs' 
lawyers that certain State courts are particularly friendly to class actions and will readily certify 
classes or approve settlements with little-if any-regard for class certification standards or the 
interests of class members."). Compare Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal Class Action 
Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing for Class Actions in Gulf Waters? 74 TuL. L. REv . 1 709, 1 7 1 5  
(2000) ("[T]he prevailing sense among some practitioners i s  that in many venues i n  the Gulf 
States-most notoriously Louisiana, Texas, and, until recently, Alabama-judges are more than 
willing to certify almost anything that walks through the courtroom doors."), with Susman, supra 
note 69, at 5 ("[W]hatever particular solicitude state courts once showed towards class actions has 
disappeared in recent years."). 
All this is not to say that there aren't a handful of extreme examples of cities and counties 
where consistently high jury awards attract plaintiffs' counsel. See, e.g., Carlyn Kolker, Madison 
County's Litigation Machine, AM. LAW.: LITIG. 2004, Dec. 2004 (supp.), at 37 (describing Madison 
County, Illinois, where "thousands of multimillion-dollar class actions and mass tort cases" are filed 
annually and "[h]undreds of large corporations have found themselves on the losing end of the jus­
tice system"; noting that last year alone, 106 class actions were filed in Edwardsville, and "more 
than 1 ,000 individual asbestos cases were set for trial"-making this small town of just 261 ,000 
residents "the bane of big businesses all over the country"). 
December 2005) Opting Out of Liability 393 
arbitration. 100 And it is from this campaign-not the ongoing class action 
battle, but the long-completed arbitration revolution-that the collective 
• • IOI 
action waiver emerges. 
A. Arbitration Hegemony 
As the mid-twentieth-century hostility to arbitration wz eventually gave 
way to acceptance, w3 and then as late-twentieth-century courts moved from 
accepting arbitration clauses to a posture of slavish deference, 104 corporate 
lawyers came to understand that there were few bounds to the limitations 
that may be placed on nominally "procedural rights" in clauses that enjoy 
the protection of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). w5 
100. Robert Alexander Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The TILA 
Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 809, 810 (2003) (noting that businesses have taken 
advantage of the many benefits of arbitration because of a "series of developments in the law of 
arbitration during the twentieth century"). 
10 l .  Professor Stemlight has noted: 
One might call this the "do it yourself' approach to law reform: the company need not con­
vince any legislature to pass revised laws, nor persuade any judicial body to change court 
rules, but rather merely choose to eliminate the pesky class action on its own. If companies at­
tempted to take direct and obvious legislative or even contractual steps to eliminate class 
actions, they would likely encounter substantial resistance, even in this era of "tort reform," 
from those who credit class actions for many important achievements. By contrast, using arbi­
tration to eliminate class actions is advantageous for class action opponents in part because it is 
surreptitious. 
Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action 
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. l ,  11 (2000) 
102. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV . 593, 619-20 (2005) 
("[T]he law had been ambivalent about enforcing obligations to participate in private dispute resolu­
tion at the expense of access to public processes. Judges guarded their own monopoly power and 
regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts."). 
103. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding invalid agreement to arbi­
trate issues arising under Securities Act of 1933), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (holding that claims arising under Securities Act 
of 1933 were arbitrable); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 
1968) (finding that antitrust claims under the Sherman Act are inappropriate for arbitration), over­
ruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985) 
(announcing a "national policy favoring arbitration," which is not precluded by an arbitration 
agreement that raises claims founded on statutory rights). A number of scholars have carefully 
documented this doctrinal shift. See, e.g., Stemlight, supra note 101, at 126. 
104. See Judith Resnik, Procedure 's Projects, 23 Civ. JusT. Q. 273, 289 (2004) ("Over the 
course of the twentieth century, the attitudes of legislators and court-based adjudicators [towards 
arbitration) changed."). 
105. Pub. L. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000)). Enacted in 
1925, the FAA apparently "call[ed] for a resounding reversal of the previous antipathy toward arbi­
tration clauses." Schwartz, supra note 100, at 810. The Supreme Court has held that "procedural" 
questions which "grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition," John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964), such as "allegation[s) of waiver, delay or a like defense to 
arbitrability," Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp, 460 U.S. l ,  25 (1983), are for 
the arbitral body to decide. So long as defendants can stuff as much as possible into this "proce­
dural" box, their arbitration agreements will likely be upheld. But see Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1109 (Cal. 2005) ("Some courts have viewed class actions or arbitrations as a 
merely procedural right, the waiver of which is not unconscionable. But as the . . .  cases of this court 
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In a series of cases decided in the 1980s and '90s, the Supreme Court iter­
ated and reiterated its view that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed 
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration." 106 The Court 
has relied on this pro-arbitration federal policy to find that claims arising un­
der federal statutes such as the Sherman Act, the Securities Act of 1933, and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are arbitrable, unless Congress 
expressly states that a judicial forum is necessary for full vindication of the 
underlying rights secured by the statute. 107 As the Court has not yet encoun­
tered a statute that explicitly states a preference for litigation over arbitration, 
it is fair to say that all federal statutory claims are prima facie arbitrable. 
Similarly, the Court has held that the FAA applies in state as well as federal 
court proceedings and preempts state legislation affecting arbitration.108 
Giving further vent to its "healthy regard" for arbitration, the Court's re­
cent jurisprudence has put more and more "gateway" issues of arbitrability 
on the plate of arbitrators. 109 While it remains (as of this writing)1 10 for courts 
to determine whether a valid contract requiring arbitration exists, 1 1 1  all other 
have continually affirmed, class actions and arbitrations are, particularly in the consumer context, 
often inextricably linked to the vindication of substantive rights. Affixing the 'procedural' label on 
such devices understates their importance and is not helpful . . . .  " (citations omitted)). 
106. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 
24; see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
107. See, e.g. , Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25; Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Shear­
son/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding that securities fraud claims brought 
under Section IO(b) of the Security Exchange Act of 1934 were arbitrable); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. , 473 U.S. at 625. 
108. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 5 17 U.S. 68 1 (1996) (finding that the FAA pre­
empted a state law requirement that a contract containing an arbitration clause include notification 
on the first page of the contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 5 1 3  U.S. 265, 272 (1995) 
(rejecting arguments by twenty state attorneys general in finding that the FAA applies in state as 
well as federal court); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484 ( 1987) (holding the FAA preempted 
California Labor Code authorizing an action for the collection of wages " 'without regard to the 
existence of any private agreement to arbitrate' "); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 ,  IO  
(1984) (holding that the FAA applies in state courts and preempting state legislation interpreted to 
protect franchisees from unfair arbitration agreements). Compare David S. Schwartz, Correcting 
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration 
Act, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoas., Winter/Spring 2005, at 5, 5 ("Despite its constant, talismanic repeti­
tion, the 'national policy favoring arbitration' is illusory and highly dubious federalism."), with 
Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the legislative History of the Fed­
eral Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 0 1 ,  105 (2002) ("[T]here are 'strong indications' in 
the legislative history that the drafters of the FAA intended it to apply in state court."). 
109. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 573 U.S. 79, 83 (2002); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; 
see also Elizabeth M. Avery, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: Class Actions and the Future of 
Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, ANTITRUST, Fall 2004, at 24 (discussing the "Court's growing body 
of jurisprudence suggesting a limited role for the courts in disputes governed by arbitration agree­
ments"). 
1 10. See infra text accompanying notes 15 1-155 (discussing the Court's recent grant of cer­
tiorari in Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005). cert. granted. 125 S. 
Ct. 2937 (2005), to resolve the question of whether a court or an arbitrator should determine 
whether a contract containing an arbitration clause is void ab initio). 
1 1 1 . Judges still retain some authority in determining whether to compel arbitration. In re­
viewing motions to compel, courts must first determine whether the arbitration clause at issue is 
valid. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2000); Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 218 (courts must compel 
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issues concerning the scope of arbitration agreements are now for arbitrators 
to decide. 1 1 2 So are questions such as whether classwide arbitration is avail­
able in a given case. 1 1 3 
In sum, the Supreme Court's arbitration jurisprudence over the past 
thirty years has evinced an incredibly expansive view of the FAA. And 
while the full import of this national policy favoring arbitration has been 
criticized by many,1 14 including members of the Court itself, 1 15 there is no 
reason to believe the Court will swing back to a more nuanced interpretation 
of the FAA. 1 16 
Buoyed by this extraordinary judicial deference, corporate lawyers and 
business executives naturally sought ways to expand the reach of arbitration 
clauses, sharing their tactical insights in trade journals, at conferences, and 
arbitration of disputes within valid arbitration agreements under the FAA). If the clause is found 
valid, the court must then determine whether the dispute between the parties is within the scope of 
the clause and suitable for a nonjudicial forum. See Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 
677, 679 (8th Cir. 2001); Daisy Mfg. Co. v. NCR Corp., 29 F.3d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1 994); 
Painewebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1 990). If the court finds the arbitration 
clause valid and the dispute arbitrable, the party opposing arbitration then bears the burden of prov­
ing any defenses to the enforcement of the agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000). Because of the presumption favoring arbitration and the 
breadth of most arbitration clauses, courts have not surprisingly found most clauses valid and most 
disputes within the scope of the agreement. See First Options, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 
( 1995); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. , 460 U.S. at 24. 
112. See David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, 
Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 80 (2003) ("[T]hese cases show a 
trend toward moving . . . enforceability questions into the arbitrator's purview, consistent with the 
sweeping pro-arbitration policy that will result in more cases . . . going to arbitration."). 
113. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality concluding that 
the arbitrator, not the South Carolina courts, should have determined whether, as a matter of contract 
interpretation, Green Tree's arbitration clause permits classwide arbitration); Howsam v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 
( 1995); see also infra text accompanying notes 132-169. 
1 14. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial 
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 267 (1995); 
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice: The Demise of Due Process in American Law, 70 TuL. L. 
REV . 1945 (1996); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public­
Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635; Schwartz, supra note 108; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking 
the Constitutionality of the Supreme Coun's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment 
of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1997). 
115. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 1 05, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dis­
senting) ("There is little doubt that the Court's interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far 
beyond the expectations of the Congress that enacted it."); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (" [T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of 
ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edi­
fice of its own creation."). Justice Thomas, in particular, has been a strong voice of dissent in nearly 
every FAA case to come before the Court. See, e.g., Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(" [T]he FAA cannot be a ground for pre-empting a state court's interpretation of a private arbitration 
agreement."); Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 60 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the choice-of-law 
provision in an arbitration agreement should make it an issue of state law, thus not governed by the 
FAA). Justice Thomas's basic position is that Congress never intended the FAA to apply to state 
courts, so the Court's decisions trigger important federalism concerns. 
116. See Ronald J. Offenkrantz, Negotiating and Drafting the Agreement to Arbitrate in 2003: 
Insuring Against a Failure of Professional Responsibility, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV . 271 ,  287 (2003) 
(" [T]he use of arbitration clauses and referrals to arbitration continues to increase unabated."). 
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in high-level, top-secret planning sessions. 1 17 Indeed, by the early 1 990s an 
ADR cottage industry was in full bloom, 1 18 fueled not by people interested 
in "alternative dispute resolution" -a sunny moniker reflecting the earnest, 
academic roots of the movement in the 1 960s-but by corporations seeking 
ways to decrease their liability risks. 
In this fertile environment, corporate lawyers created the collective ac­
tion waiver and wrapped their newborn in the cloak of an arbitration clause, 
protecting it against attack with the now sacrosanct policies of the FAA. 1 19 
B. The Birth of the Collective Action Waiver 
In the late 1 990s, trade-journal articles first appeared encouraging cor­
porate counsel to consider redrafting contracts to include provisions 
requiring consumers and others to waive the right to participate in class ac­
tions or even group arbitrations. A 1 997 "Practice Tips" column in the 
Franchise Law Journal suggested that, in the wake of a nine-figure class 
action jury verdict in favor of Meineke Discount Muffler franchisees against 
the home office, 120 franchisors should seriously consider requiring: 
each franchisee in the potential class to pursue individual claims in a sepa­
rate arbitration. Since many (and perhaps most) of the putative class 
members may never do that, and because arbitrators do not issue runaway 
awards, strict enforcement of an arbitration clause should enable the fran­
chisor to dramatically reduce its aggregate exposure. 121 
Another corporate attorney writing in a business journal recommended 
that commercial clients take full advantage of the favorable Supreme Court 
1 1 7.  See Complaint, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7 1 16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1 1 ,  2005). This class 
action complaint filed on behalf of all credit and charge card holders alleges that the defendant 
banks' inclusion of collective action waivers in cardholder agreements is a violation of federal anti­
trust laws. Id. The complaint further alleges that defendants held a series of secret meetings to 
discuss the implementation of these waivers. Id. , see infra text accompanying notes 1 28- 1 3 1 .  
1 1 8. Resnik, supra note 102, a t  617- 1 8  ("[T]he market i n  ADR appears t o  b e  flourishing­
with conferences (on topics such as 'Court ADR'), services (through firms with names such as 
'EndDispute' or 'JAMS' . . .  ) law school classes, model rules, and an ever-expanding literature 
addressing the progress and challenges." (footnotes omitted)). 
1 19. Collective action waivers are not the only problematic clauses grafted onto arbitration 
provisions. P rofessor David Schwartz writes of a number of "remedy-stripping" clauses folded into 
broad arbitration agreements by "overzealous drafters" who hoped that "the courts' enthusiasm for 
enforcing arbitration clauses would spill over onto the logically separable remedy limitation, one 
that would have had no chance of enforcement without the arbitration clause." Schwartz, supra note 
1 1 2, at 49-50. 
1 20. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, 958 F. Supp. 1087 (W.D.N.C 1997), rev 'd on 
other grounds, 155 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998). 
1 2 1 .  Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 FRANCHISE 
L.J. 141 ,  141  ( 1 997). The author is a partner at the law firm Wiggin & Dana, which represents a 
number of franchisors. Citing other cases in which franchisors inserted such agreements into their 
franchise agreements and escaped massive liability, the author warned that "[i]n this day and age . . . 
most class action suits against established franchisors will involve impressively large aggregate 
damage claims . . . .  [And while] [a]n arbitration clause may not be an invincible shield against class 
action litigation, it is surely one of the strongest pieces of armor available to the franchisor." Id. at 
142. 
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arbitration jurisprudence by incorporating class action waivers into arbitra-
. l h 
. 1 122 N f 
. tion c auses w enever practica . umerous reports o companies 
implementing these sorts of provisions also began to appear in the popular 
99 1 23 press throughout the late 1 Os. 
This movement accelerated in 1 999, when the National Arbitration Fo­
rum ("NAF''), a for-profit arbitral body designated in the arbitration 
provisions of many large companies, 1 24 disseminated marketing materials 
cautioning corporate attorneys that the only way to insulate their clients from 
class action liability in general-and Y2K computer class action liability in 
particular-was to implement arbitration provisions containing terms that 
expressly waive the right to class treatrnent. 125 Companies were responsive to 
this pitch. American Express, for example, sent notices to some two million 
small-merchant accounts stating that, henceforth, their merchant agreements 
would be deemed to include arbitration provisions containing express class 
waivers; 126 if the merchant objected, it was free to terminate its relationship 
1 22. Kay 0. Wilburn, A Clause You Don't Want to Overlook, Bus. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 1 996, 
at 55, 57-58. 
1 23. For example, Alan Kaplinsky, an attorney representing major financial services institu­
tions, was quoted as saying that "[a]rbitration is a powerful deterrent to class action lawsuits against 
lenders . . . .  Stripped of the threat of a class action, plaintiffs' lawyers have much less incentive to 
sue." Paul Wenske, Some Cardholders Are Signing Away Their Right to Sue, KAN. CITY STAR, May 
I ,  2000, at A8; see also Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, 
Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 702 (2004) (citing Class 
Action Bans in Arbitration Pacts Could Create Limits on Substantive Rights, U.S. L. WK., Nov. 25, 
2003, at 2294 (Robert P. Davis, Esq. stated that he counseled his clients that the primary advantage 
of arbitration is that it allows them to avoid class actions: "despite the potential disadvantages to 
employers who require arbitration, the primary question asked by companies considering arbitration 
is: 'Can we cut off class and collective actions by requiring arbitration?' ")); Michael Ferry, Con­
sumers: Forced Arbitration Is Bad, ST. Loms PosT-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1 992, at 7D ("The banks, 
[for example,] are rewriting their consumer contracts-such as credit-card agreements and account 
agreements-to state that either the bank or a customer will refer a dispute to binding arbitra­
tion. . . . [T]he banks . . .  are afraid of big jury verdicts and big class actions against them. They 
think arbitrators will be less likely than juries to give customers big damage awards."); Caroline E. 
Mayer, The Price is Rights: People Are Signing Away Consumer Protections-and Many Don't Even 
Know It, NEWSDAY, May 30, 1999, at F8 (reporting that a growing number of companies are "re­
writing the fine print of their contracts and sales agreements to require that consumers agree, in 
advance, to give up their right to sue and submit disagreements to arbitrators [and that] [s]uch 
clauses also bar consumers from participating in class action suits"). 
124. NAF is "the exclusive arbitration administer of American Express, Discover (as of 2005), 
MBNA, and until 2003, First USA (now owned by Chase). It is also designated as an arbitration 
administrator for Capital One, Chase, Citibank, Diners Club, Household, and P rovidian." Complaint 
'l[ 1 20, Ross v. Bank of Am., 05 Civ. 7 1 1 6  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1 1 ,  2005). 
1 25. Complaint, 'l[ 23 B, Corbett v. National Arbitration Forum, CGC-04-43 1-430 (May 17, 
2004) (discussing an April 16, 1998 letter from NAF's director to a corporate defense lawyer warn­
ing that "the 'class action bar' is threatening lawsuits over the Y 2K issue," and warning that the 
" 'only thing' that will 'prevent' such suits is the adoption of an NAF arbitration clause 'in every 
contract, note and security agreement' "); see also id. 'l[ 22 D (also alleging that an NAF executive 
wrote to a prospective client in 1999 that "[a] number of courts around the country have held that a 
properly-drafted arbitration clause in credit applications and agreements eliminates class actions" 
and that NAF "will make a positive impact on the bottom line"). 
1 26. The clause applies only to "small merchants," defined by American Express as those 
transacting less than $ 10 million in charges annually. In its contracts with these small merchants, 
American Express retains the right to unilaterally amend by furnishing written notice, such as "en­
velope stuffers" that accompany monthly statements. P laintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition 
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with American Express and discontinue acceptance of the card. The AmEx 
waivers are pretty typical: they provide that the claimant may not participate 
in any class action or class wide arbitration, and may not join its claims with 
those of any other merchant inside the arbitral arena.127 
1 .  The Clandestine Role of the Credit Card Industry 
The development of collective action waivers was also aided by a brain 
trust of lawyers and business executives in the credit card industry. In a class 
action complaint filed in August 2005 against the major U.S.  card-issuing 
banks, plaintiffs allege that defendants held a series of high-level, top-secret 
meetings beginning in 1 998 to discuss the imposition and use of collective 
action waivers. 128 Towards those ends, plaintiffs allege the defendants 
formed internal organizations "devoted to collectively promoting and im­
plementing" these waivers by filing "amicus curiae briefs for the purpose of 
persuading courts to enforce onerous and one-sided arbitration clauses," and 
"filing countersuits against class action lawyers and suits for abuse of proc­
ess," among other activities. 129 According to the complaint, the defendant 
banks-normally cut-throat and fierce competitors-in this instance ille­
gally colluded to fix material terms offered to cardholders. 130 
The plaintiffs' allegations of defendants' numerous clandestine meetings 
and other communications, which have withstood a motion to dismiss,131 tell 
a fascinating story of an entire industry conspiring to avoid class action ex­
posure by working together on drafting, implementing, and defending 
to Motion to Compel Arbitration at 7, 1 1 ,  In Re Am. Express Merchants' Litig.,  03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003). 
1 27. The clause provides: "You will not have the right to participate in a representative capac­
ity or as a member of any class of claimants pertaining to any claim subject to arbitration . . . .  There 
shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class action basis or on any basis 
involving Claims brought in a purported representative capacity on behalf of the general public, 
other establishments which accept the Card (Service Establishments), or other persons or entities 
similarly situated. Furthermore, Claims brought by or against a Service Establishment may not be 
joined or consolidated in the arbitration with Claims brought by or against any other Service Estab­
lishment(s), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by all parties." Id. app. tab 4 (quoting Terms and 
Conditions for American Express Card Acceptance, dated October 1999). 
1 28. Complaint 'Jl 2, Ross v. Banlc of Am., 05 Civ. 7 1 1 6  (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Plaintiffs claim that 
defendants' collusive actions constitute an anticompetitive restraint on trade in violation of federal 
antitrust laws and seek declaratory judgment and an injunction against continued use of collective 
action waivers, as well as the withdrawal of all currently pending motions to compel arbitration. Id. 
1 29. Id. 'll'l! 97-1 1 8. One internal group was the "Arbitration Coalition," whose primary re­
sponsibility was to identify potential members (that is, banks and credit card companies seeking to 
reduce or eliminate their exposure to class actions by consumers). Id. (citing correspondence indi­
cating that the Arbitration Coalition held at least sixteen meetings and conference calls from 
November 1 7, 1999 to October 2003 during which it identified and contacted "[l]eading companies 
that have adopted or are considering adopting arbitration to resolve disputes with their consumer 
customers"). Another internal group, the "Consumer Class Action Working Group," "was spawned 
from the Arbitration Coalition's ongoing frustrations with class actions." Id. 'll'll 1 1 3-14. 
1 30. Id. 'll'l! 1 05--07 (citing email correspondence and meeting agendas in which the defendants 
discuss the "need to control class action litigation" by "sharing our thoughts and materials"). 
1 3 1 .  Memorandum and Order, Ross v. Am. Express Co., 04-Civ. 5723 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
27, 2005). 
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collective action waivers. And for our purposes here, the plaintiffs' story 
foreshadows the lengths to which corporate defendants are willing to go to 
implement these waivers and defend them against legal challenge. 
C. First-Wave Challenges 
Inevitably, some of the companies that implemented class action waivers 
have since found themselves as the defendants in putative class actions. As 
these defendants asserted the waivers as a defense, plaintiffs' lawyers looked 
for ways to challenge their enforceability. For the most part, these "first­
wave" challenges took one of two forms:  (i) that the waivers are uncon­
scionable as a matter of state law, or (ii) that compelling arbitration is 
facially inconsistent with the underlying federal statute upon which claims 
are based. 
1. Unconscionability 
Plaintiffs challenging collective action waivers looked first to the com­
mon law contract doctrine of unconscionability. 132 Under the FAA, a party 
may oppose arbitration on such "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,"133 and the Supreme Court has held that state-law 
unconscionability can be such a basis. 134 
B asic contract law directs that a contractual provision be deemed unen­
forceable and unconscionable if it is both procedurally and substantively 
unconscionable: "the former focusing on ' oppression' or ' surprise' due to 
unequal bargaining power, the latter on 'overly harsh' or 'one-sided' re­
sults."135 
Unconscionability analysis has met with occasional success as a basis 
for challenging arbitration clauses generally, such as in cases where the 
claimant is forced to trek across the country to file his arbitration, or where 
the rules spelled out in the arbitration agreement force him to give up the 
1 32. See, e.g .. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965); 
6A ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1376, at 21 ( 1962) (stating that standard­
ized contracts offered to individuals on an "accept this or get nothing basis" are subject to vigilant 
judicial scrutiny to avoid enforcement of unconscionable provisions). 
133.  See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). 
1 34. Doctor's Assocs .. Inc. v. Casarotto, 5 1 7  U.S. 68 1 ,  687 ( 1996) (holding that "generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate 
arbitration agreements without contravening § 2" of the FAA). 
Id. 
135.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 1 1 3  P.3d 1 1 00, l l08 (Cal. 2005). The court continued: 
The procedural element of an unconscionable contract generally takes the form of a contract of 
adhesion, "which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates 
to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it." . . .  Substan­
tively unconscionable terms may take various forms, but may generally be described as 
unfairly one-sided. 
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right to, say, pumtlve damages, or other remedies. 136 But the courts' 
reactions to unconscionability challenges leveled at collective action waivers 
have been far less positive: with the exception of a handful of cases137 (mostly 
out of the Ninth Circuit and California)138 finding such clauses substantively 
unconscionable, a vast majority of decisions have upheld collective action 
waivers against this challenge. 139 
1 36. See, e.g., Hull v. Norcom, Inc., 750 F.2d 1 547, 1551 (I I th Cir. 1985) (arbitration clause 
unconscionable because it gave the drafting party an "arbitration option," while forcing the non­
drafting party to arbitrate all claims); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 621 P.2d 165, 173 (Cal. 1981) 
("[The arbitration clause is unconscionable] because it  designates an arbitrator who, by reason of its 
status and identity, is presumptively biased in favor of one party . . . .  "); Ramirez v. Circuit City 
Stores Inc., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 9 1 6, 920 (Ct. App. 1999) (arbitration clause unconscionable because it 
barred punitive damages); P atterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 564 (Ct. 
App. 1993), rev. denied, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563 ( 1 993) (arbitration clause unconscionable where it 
required all disputes to "be resolved by binding arbitration by the National Arbitration Forum, Min­
neapolis, Minnesota," a far distance for plaintiffs to travel). 
1 37. See Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 66, 1 1 78 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (find­
ing bar on classwide arbitrations unconscionable under Washington law); Lozada v. Dale Baker 
Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1 1�5 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (striking down collective action 
waiver as unconscionable and suggesting that it is impermissible to use arbitration provisions to 
completely eliminate exposure to class liability, and potentially to any liability at all, given that 
individual claims would have been impractical to pursue); P owertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (same); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002) 
(explaining that it was neither the class waiver nor the arbitration clause, taken alone, that rendered 
the provision void, but the use of these provisions in combination which raised suspicions of an 
unconscionable adhesion contract at work), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1087 (2002); see also Jean R. 
Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient 
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, LAW & CoNTEMP. P Ross., Winter/Spring 2004, at 75, 
78 n. 13  (2004) (citing additional cases striking down collective action waivers as unconscionable). 
1 38. See infra text accompanying notes 1 39-150. 
1 39. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d 868 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2005); Iberia Credit 
Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004); Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., 
Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003); Snowden v. CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 63 1 ,  638 (4th 
Cir. 2002) ("We also reject Snowden's argument that the Arbitration Agreement is unenforceable as 
unconscionable because without the class action vehicle, she will be unable to maintain her legal 
representation given the small amount of her individual damages."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1 087 
(2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2001); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. 
Corp., 244 F.3d 8 1 4, 8 1 8  (I I th Cir. 2001); Lomax v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc'y, 228 F. 
Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 2002); Mcintyre v. Household Bank, 2 1 6  F. Supp. 2d 7 1 9, 724 (N.D. Ill. 
2002); Vigil v. Sears Nat'! Bank, 205 F. Supp. 2d 566 (E.D. La. 2002); Pick v. Discover Fin. Servs., 
Inc., No. Civ.A. 00-935-SLR, 2001 WL 1 1 80278, at *S (D. Del. Sept. 28, 2001) ("[I]t is generally 
accepted that arbitration clauses are not unconscionable because they preclude class actions."); 
Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank, 1 63 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 89, 1 195 (S.D. Cal. 2001)  (rejecting argument 
that arbitration clause was unconscionable because it denied consumers the ability to pursue class 
actions and thereby vindicate small claims); Goetsch v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.R.D. 574, 578--79 
(W.D.N.C. 2000); Marsh v. First USA Bank, 103 F. Supp. 2d 909, 922 (N.D. Tex. 2000); Frerichs v. 
Credential Servs. Int'!, 1 999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 228 1 1  (N.D. Ill . 1999); Zawikowski v. Beneficial 
Nat'I Bank, No. 98 C 2 1 78, 1999 WL 35304, at *2 (N.D. Ill . Jan. 1 1 , 1999); Howard v. Klynveld 
P eat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), ajf'd, 173 F.3d 844 (2d Cir. 1 999); 
Med Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So. 2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998); Rains v. Found. Health Sys. Life & 
Health, 23 P.3d 1 249, 1 253 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)  ("[A]rbitration clauses are not unenforceable 
simply because they might render a class action unavailable."); Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 
A.2d 1 249, 1 261 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001); Brown v. KFC Nat'! Mgmt. Co., 92 1 P.2d 146 (Haw. 
1996); Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 
A.2d 735 (Md. 2005); Gras v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 786 A.2d 886, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2001)  (enforcing class action provision against unconscionability challenge and concluding that 
there is no "overriding public policy in favor of class actions"); Ranieri v. Bell Atl. Mobile, 759 
December 2005] Opting Out of Liability 401 
a. California 's Minority Position 
California is currently the only state whose courts have regularly struck 
down collective action waivers in standard-form agreements as unconscion­
able. 140 In nearly all of these cases, courts have focused on the inherent 
unfairness of a contractual clause that prevents claimants "from seeking re­
dress for relatively small amounts of money"14 1  and thus immunizes 
defendants from class or representative suits. 142 
Recently, a fractured California Supreme Court endorsed these interpre­
tations of its state's unconscionability doctrine. In Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court, the majority held that "at least some class action waivers in 
consumer contracts are unconscionable under California law."143 Specifi­
cally, the Discover Bank case focused on collective action waiver provisions 
that the defendant credit card company imposed upon the consumer as "an 
amendment to its cardholder agreement in the form of a 'bill-stuffer' that he 
would be deemed to accept if he did not close his account."144 The court held 
that such adhesive provisions are unconscionable under California law 
where they "may operate effectively as exculpatory contract clauses that are 
contrary to public policy."145 While acknowledging that California is clearly 
in the minority on this issue, the court was moved by the "important role of 
class action remedies in California law,"146 as "the only effective way to halt 
and redress [consumer] exploitation."147 
N.Y.S.2d 448 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Strand v. U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass'n ND, 693 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 
2005); AutoNation USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App. 2003); Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 
17 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
140. See, e.g., Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1173 (N.D. Cal. 2002); ACORN v. 
Household Int'!, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. 
v. Mantor, 335 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 
2003); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
862 (Ct. App. 2002); Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 699 (Ct. App. 2001). 
141. Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. 
142. See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175 ("[Bly barring class arbitration in a contract of its own 
drafting, the defendant 'sought to create for itself virtual immunity from class or representative 
actions despite their potential merit . . .  .' " (quoting Szetela, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867)); Ting v. 
AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2002), modified, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding 
collective action waiver unconscionable because it "will prevent class members from effectively 
vindicating their rights in certain categories of claims, especially those involving practices applica­
ble to all members of the class but as to which any consumer has so little at stake"); Szete/a, 118 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868 ("The clause is not only harsh and unfair to Discover customers who might be 
owed a relatively small sum of money, but it also serves as a disincentive for Discover to avoid the 
type of conduct that might lead to class action litigation in the first place . . . .  The potential for mil­
lions of customers to be overcharged small amounts without an effective method of redress cannot 
be ignored."). 
143. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 1106. 
147. Id. at 1105. 
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An interesting upshot of this ruling falls under the rubric of choice-of- . 
law. 148 The dissent in Discover Bank warned darkly that the majority decision 
will establish California as a "magnet" jurisdiction for plaintiffs' lawyers. 149 
On this view, plaintiffs who are otheiwise bound by collective action waiv­
ers will rush into California to file suit, seeking to hide behind the Discover 
Bank decision. This fear, I think, is greatly exaggerated. Under the terms of 
Discover Bank itself, the court may not disregard a contractual choice-of­
law provision solely because the chosen state's  law would undermine a fun­
damental policy of California-as any collective action waiver now plainly 
would. Rather, it must also be the case that, in the absence of any contrac­
tual choice-of-law provision, California law would apply. This further 
limitation surely protects the Golden State from itinerant plaintiffs ' lawyers 
in search of favorable laws. 150 
b. The Future of Unconscionability 
On its face, the Discover Bank decision looks extremely promising from 
the perspective of consumer groups, liberal commentators, and plaintiffs' 
lawyers. The highest court of the nation's most populous state expressed the 
commonsensical notion that collective action waivers are inexcusably op­
pressive tools of corporate defendants seeking immunity from liability for 
widespread wrongdoing. One can hear the sighs of relief-"finally !" 
But the Discover Bank decision is already imperiled: one week before 
the California Supreme Court entered its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. to resolve a 
split in the state and federal courts over whether a court or an arbitrator has 
authority to determine the legality of an underlying contract containing an 
arbitration provision. 15 1 
148. The Discover court remanded the case for resolution of the choice-of-law issue. The 
contract at issue designated Delaware law as controlling, but the court advised that should the trial 
judge find that Delaware's acceptance of collective action waivers is "contrary to a fundamental 
policy of California," the court must "then determine whether California has a 'materially greater 
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue' " and that California's law 
would otherwise apply but for the choice-of-law provision. Id. at 1 1 1 7 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEC­
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 87(2)(b) ( 197 1 )). 
149. Id. at 1 1 1 8  (Baxter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[l]f California courts 
must, or may, dishonor class action waivers that are perfectly valid under the governing law selected 
by the parties themselves, California-which now takes a minority position on this issue-might 
well become the magnet for countless nationwide consumer class action lawsuits that could not be 
maintained elsewhere."). 
1 50. A second interesting upshot of Discover Bank is that it calls into question the assump­
tion-shared by this author-that the Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle precludes a court, as 
opposed to an arbitrator, from ordering classwide arbitration where an agreement expressly prohibits 
collective action. See generally infra Section 11.E. 
1 5 1 .  Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 2005) [hereinafter Buck­
eye //], cert. granted,, 1 25 S. Ct. 2937 (June 20, 2005) [hereinafter Buckeye Ill]; see also Andrew J. 
Pincus & David Gossett, Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw LLP, United States: Supreme Court Docket 
Report, MoND AQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 8, 2005, available at http:www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp? 
articleid=33564&print=l (noting that the Florida Supreme Court's decision is "consistent with 
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In Buckeye, plaintiffs entered into "payday loan" arrangements with the 
defendant, 152 which included signing a contract containing an arbitration 
clause, and subsequently filed a class action against Buckeye for charging 
"usurious interest from thousands of customers for consumer loans" in 
violation of Florida law.1 53 The parties disagreed over whether the FAA 
required this challenge to be resolved by the trial court or the arbitrator. The 
Florida Supreme Court concluded that the FAA does not preclude a state 
court asked to compel arbitration from first deciding whether the contract at 
issue violates state law. 154 
Six federal circuit courts of appeal, on the other hand, have come to the 
opposite conclusion, finding that under Prima Paint, 155 the illegality of an 
underlying contract containing an arbitration clause is a question for the 
arbitrator under the FAA and not the court under state common law. 156 These 
federal courts have all compelled arbitration and left it to the arbitral bodies 
to resolve questions of illegality or fraud in the making of the contract. 
So while the Buckeye controversy seems to revolve around a fairly nar­
row doctrinal question-whether the FAA preempts state courts from 
decisions of the Alabama, Minnesota, and South Dakota supreme courts," but that "all six federal 
circuit courts that have considered the issue have reached the opposite result"). 
1 52. Buckeye II, 894 So. 2d at 865 (Bell, J., specially concurring). According to the plaintiffs, 
Buckeye was engaged in "what it falsely portrayed as a check cashing service," when in reality, it 
"charged and collected unconscionably usurious interest" from consumers. Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 5, Buckeye l/l 1 25 S. Ct. 2937 (2005) (No. 04- 1 264), available at 
2005 WL 1285615. Buckeye essentially loaned its customers money against their next paycheck or 
government-issued check; customers "unable to repay these loans when due were permitted to ex­
tend their debt or roll-over their loans with Buckeye by paying 'service fees.' " The fee on these 
extensions "ranged from approximately 1 37% to 1 ,3 17 %  A.P.R., and the rate was usually over 300% 
A.P.R." Id. at 5-6. 
1 53.  When the defendant moved to compel arbitration of the claim, plaintiffs countered that 
the "arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it is contained in an illegal usurious con­
tract and is, therefore, void ab initio." Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 824 So. 2d 228, 
229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) [hereinafter Buckeye I]. The trial court agreed with plaintiffs on the 
illegality of the contract and denied Buckeye's motion to compel arbitration. Id. The intermediate 
appellate court then reversed, finding the trial court erred in deciding the illegality issue because 
plaintiffs' "challenge to the underlying contract's validity must be resolved by an arbitrator, not a 
trial court." Buckeye II, 894 So. 2d at 862. 
1 54. Florida's highest court found that state "public policy and contract law prohibit breathing 
life into a potentially illegal contract by enforcing the included arbitration clause." Buckeye II, 894 
So. 2d at 864. In response to the court's ruling, payday lenders have lobbied the Florida legislature 
to reconsider a bill that would prohibit customers from challenging these contracts in court­
legislation that would essentially overturn the ruling in Buckeye. The proposed legislation, Senate 
Bill 2242, was approved by the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee in a 4-3 vote along party lines, 
with Senate Democrats arguing the bill was "unfair to low-income consumers who can challenge an 
illegal contract in court for nearly free due to legal services, but may have to split thousands of 
dollars in arbitration fees if they can't go to court." Joe Follick, Payday Lending Bill Moves On, 
SARASOTA TRIB., Apr. 13,  2005, at BS6. 
155.  Prima Paint Corp. v.  Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,  388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
156. See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance LLC, 400 F.3d 868 ( 1 1th Cir. 2005); Bess v. 
Check Express, 294 F.3d 1 298 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2002); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 
63 1 (4th Cir. 2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash, LLC, 267 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 200 1 ); Harter v. Iowa 
Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2000), amended by Nos. 98-301 0  & 98-3817,  2000 U.S. App. 
Lexis 1 4467 (7th Cir. June 2 1 ,  2001); Lawrence v. Comprehensive Bus. Servs. Co., 833 F.2d 1 1 59 
(5th Cir. 1 987). 
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entertaining illegality challenges to contracts containing arbitration clauses­
there would seem to be no principled reason why Buckeye would not also 
govern the issue of who decides whether an arbitration clause is unconscion­
able under state contract law. Should the Supreme Court disagree with the 
Florida court and find that arbitrators have sole authority to determine the le­
gality of the underlying contract under the FAA, I would then expect the 
lower courts to conclude that determinations on all state law contractual de­
fenses to arbitration-including unconscionability-rest exclusively with the 
arbitrator. Indeed, the California Supreme Court in Discover Bank appears to 
have anticipated and sought to head off this possibility: noting that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had not yet addressed "the question [of] whether [the] deter­
mination of unconscionability should be made by a court or an arbitrator,"157 
the court asserted that such challenges are grounded in state common law and 
are therefore best left to state courts to decide. 158 
While it is impossible to predict what the Supreme Court will decide in 
Buckeye, or the scope of its decision, the Court's pro-arbitration jurisprudence 
and penchant for giving arbitrators greater and greater authority raises the 
distinct possibility that unconscionability may become a dead-end in efforts to 
invalidate collective action waivers. 1 59 
2. Facial Inconsistency of Arbitration with 
Federal Statutory Rights 
Another argument often made by first-wave plaintiffs' counsel was that 
the collective action waiver is inconsistent with the provisions of the substan­
tive federal statute being sued upon. One such statute is the Truth in Lending 
Act ("TILA"), which unambiguously provides for class action litigation in the 
text of the statute. 160 In a series of cases, courts have upheld collective action 
waivers in TILA cases, in the face of plaintiffs' arguments that the waiver 
1 57. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 1 13 P.3d 1100, 1115 (Cal. 2005). 
15  8. Id. at 1113. The court went on to state that ''the FAA does not federalize the law of uncon­
scionability or related contract defenses except to the extent that it forbids the use of such defenses to 
discriminate against arbitration clauses." Id. at 1 1 12-13. Because, in the court's view, "California's rule 
against class action waivers" does not target arbitration clauses, this rule cannot be preempted. Id. at 
1112. 
159. Professor Jean Stemlight is equally concerned about this outcome: "One of the really con­
troversial issues is: Who decides whether arbitration itself is unconscionable--should it be a court or an 
arbitrator who might be biased?" Molly Selvin, High Court Takes on Right to Sue, L.A. IlMES, June 25, 
2005, at Cl .  Professor Sternlight also predicted that the Supreme Court would reverse the Aorida Su­
preme Court. Id. 
160. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000). 
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irreconcilably conflicts with the statute's enforcement scheme.161 For example, 
in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 162 plaintiff asserted that: 
Congress consciously inserted language into the statutes with the intent of 
encouraging district court j udges to certify class actions . . . .  [and that] in 
the legislative history of amendments to the TILA, Congress communi­
cated that class action remedies play a central role in the TILA . . .  
enforcement schemes . . . .  [and further that] such litigation is meant to 
serve public policy goals through plaintiffs who act as private attorneys 
general, for the class action device is necessary to ensure meaningful de­
terrence to creditors who might violate the acts. 163 
The district court agreed with the plaintiff's argument on the "inherent 
conflict" between the statutory language and the arbitration clause and 
denied the motion to compel arbitration. 164 The Third Circuit reversed, 
explaining that "while arbitrating claims that might have been pursued as 
part of class actions potentially reduces the number of plaintiffs seeking to 
enforce the TILA against creditors, arbitration does not eliminate plaintiff 
incentives to assert rights under the Act."165 After all, a plaintiff's individual 
recovery is the same whether a case is brought as a class action or as an 
individual suit. So while acknowledging that the plaintiff might be "correct 
in arguing that Congress contemplated class actions as a part of the TILA 
enforcement scheme, and even that class actions were self-consciously 
promoted by Congress in amending the statute,"166 the court nonetheless 
held that the arbitration clause did not defeat "TILA's goal of encouraging 
private actions to deter violations of the act."167 
Other federal circuit courts have reached similar results. 168 As a conse­
quence, it appears that a congressional enactment will not be found to be 
1 6 1 .  See, e.g., Lloyd v. MBNA Am. Bank, No. 01- 1752, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1027, at *4-5 
(3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2002) (stating that because right to a class action is "merely procedural," and thus "may 
be waived," an arbitration agreement barring classwide relief for claims brought under TILA is enforce­
able); Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 1024 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2003) (same); Sagal v. First 
USA Bank, 69 F. Supp. 2d 627, 632 (D. Del. 1999) (compelling arbitration of plaintiff's TILA claims 
even though he was precluded from representing a class), ajf'd, 254 F.3d 1078 (3d Cir. 2001). 
162. 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1 145 (2001). 
163. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 368-69. 
164. Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D. Del. 1999). 
165. Johnson, 255 F.3d at 374 ("The sums available in recovery to individual plaintiffs are not 
automatically increased by the use of the class forum."). The court also observed that arbitration 
would not "necessarily choke off the supply of lawyers willing to pursue claims on behalf of debt­
ors" because "[a]ttomeys' fees are recoverable under the TILA." Id. 
166. Id. at 373. 
167. Id. at 374-75. 
168. See Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 63 1 ,  638-39 (4th Cir. 2002) (re­
jecting plaintiff's claim that she would be "unable to maintain her legal representation given the 
small amount of her individual damages" and concluding that there is "no violation of public policy 
relating to consumer protection" in allowing TILA claims to be arbitrated);  Randolph v. Green Tree 
Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814,  8 1 8  (I I th Cir. 2001 )  (finding that plaintiff failed to "establish that Con­
gress intended to preclude the arbitration of TILA claims, even where arbitration would prevent the 
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facially incompatible with a collective action waiver in the absence of a spe­
cific statutory antiwaiver provision, which Congress has yet to include in 
l 
. 
l . 169 any eg1s attve enactment. 
D. Second-Wave Challenges 
None of this means, however, that a collective action waiver might not 
be void where it serves, in the individual case, to prevent a plaintiff from 
vindicating federal statutory rights. Beginning with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ,
110 the Court has repeatedly stated (albeit in 
dicta) that there is one critical limitation upon the availability of arbitration 
as a forum for the resolution of federal statutory claims: such claims may 
only be arbitrated "so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindi­
cate his or her statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum."11 1 Looked at in 
this way, Johnson and related cases hold only that the federal statutes are not 
facially irreconcilable with the collective action waiver; that plaintiffs are 
not necessarily and always precluded by the waiver from being able to vin­
dicate their federal rights under this federal statute. Put another way: 
plaintiffs' lawyers can concede that the right to engage in collective action is 
a procedural and waivable right, and yet argue that where the waiver of that 
right in the particular case precludes the plaintiff from being able to vindi­
cate his substantive federal statutory rights, the waiver must fall. 172 
And so, defeated but not deterred, plaintiffs' lawyers have begun to 
launch a second-generation challenge, asserting that the collective action 
waiver's implicit prohibition against spreading the costs of litigation or arbi­
tration across multiple claimants precludes the individual plaintiff in certain 
cases from being able to vindicate her federal statutory rights. 
claims from being brought in the form of a class action" and that "Congress did not intend to pre­
clude parties from contracting away their ability to seek class action relief under the TILA"). 
1 69. The statutory antiwaiver provision would have to clearly reveal a congressional intent 
that disputes be resolved in a judicial forum, even in cases involving otherwise binding arbitration 
clauses. At one time, for example, the Supreme Court held that the antiwaiver provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1 933 indicated that Congress had intended that parties had an absolute right to a 
judicial forum, see Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), but the Court has since overruled Wilko in 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. , 490 U.S. 477 ( 1989), requiring a clearer 
statement of congressional intent to trump the applicability of the FAA. 
1 70. 473 U.S. 6 1 4  (1985). 
1 7 1 .  Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (brackets omitted) (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 
U.S. 20, 28 ( 1 99 1 )  (same); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 3 1 7  F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(en bane) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that statutory rights . . .  may be subject to mandatory 
arbitration only if the arbitral forum permits the effective vindication of those rights." (emphasis 
added)). 
1 72. See Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1983, 1995 (2002) ("The treatment of statutory rights is different because of the public 
interest in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights-an interest that is separate from private 
parties' interest in resolving a dispute between themselves. In order for these rights to be submitted 
to arbitration, the arbitration must allow effective vindication of them. Any arbitration of a statutory 
claim that did not allow for effective vindication of rights would 'conflict[) with the statute's pur­
pose of both providing individual relief and generally deterring unlawful conduct through the 
enforcement of its provisions.' " (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted)). 
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The new challenges are rooted in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Randolph, 173 where the Court recognized that the cost of prosecuting a par­
ticular claim under a particular arbitration agreement may serve as the 
predicate for finding that the litigant cannot "effectively vindicate" her 
rights under the rule of Mitsubishi: "It may well be that the existence of 
large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . .  from effectively vindicat­
ing her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum."174 
The case law that has sprouted up under Green Tree holds that statutory 
claims may be subjected to arbitration so long as the agreement at issue 
does not force plaintiffs to assume financial burdens so prohibitive as to "de­
ter the bringing of claims."1 75 
The simple logic of this second-wave argument is that the collective ac­
tion waiver-and particularly its implicit ban on spreading across multiple 
plaintiffs the costs of experts, depositions, neutrals '  fees, and other dis­
bursements-forces the individual claimant to assume financial burdens so 
prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims. 176 In the absence of the waiver, 
the claimant may spread these costs across thousands of coventurers (or 
have them advanced by lawyers, as happens in practice). In the presence of 
the waiver, these costs fall on her alone. And these costs, in a complex 
commercial case, will exceed the value of the recovery she is seeking.1 77 
A case sure to test this theory is currently underway in federal court in 
New York, where numerous small retailers are seeking class treatment for 
1 73. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
1 74. Green Tree, 5 3 1  U.S. at 90. 
1 75. Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 200 1 )  
("[T]he appropriate inquiry i s  one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum i n  a particular case i s  an 
adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among 
other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost dif­
ferential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that cost differential is so 
substantial as to deter the bringing of claims."); see Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int'!, 324 F.3d 2 1 2, 2 1 7  
(3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the Third Circuit will follow the approach of Sixth and Fourth Circuits 
in Morrison and Bradford, and striking provisions in arbitration clause that would have caused 
plaintiff to incur prohibitive costs); Morrison, 3 1 7  F.3d at 658 (explaining that the inquiry is whether 
"the arbitral forum under a particular arbitration agreement effectively prevents the vindication of a 
plaintiff's statutory rights" and holding that a provision affecting the allocation of costs "should be 
held unenforceable whenever it would have the 'chilling effect' of deterring a substantial number of 
potential litigants from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights" (emphasis added)); Martin v. SCI 
Mgmt. L.P., 296 F. Supp. 2d 462, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Morrison and noting that, under 
Green Tree, 53 1 U.S. 79 (2000), "significant arbitration costs could preclude a litigant from effec­
tively vindicating her federal statutory rights in an arbitral forum"); Mildworm v. Ashcroft, 200 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 7 1 ,  1 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Wexler, J.) (following Bradford). 
1 76. As the Fourth Circuit held: "(T]he proper inquiry under Gilmer is not where the money 
goes but rather the amount of money that ultimately will be paid by the claimant." Bradford, 238 
F.3d at 556; see also Morrison, 3 1 7  F.3d at 660 (same). 
1 77. A somewhat related argument, available only in cases where the defendant enjoys "mar­
ket power" within the meaning of the antitrust laws, is that the forced imposition of the collective 
action waiver is, itself, an anticompetitive vertical restraint. This argument was rejected in Jn re 
Universal Serv. Fund Tel.  Billing Practices Litig., No. 02-MD-1468, 2003 WL 2 1254765, at * l  (D. 
Kan. May 27, 2003). More recently, the plaintiffs have made a similar argument in the American 
Express litigation currently pending in federal court in New York. See Amended Complaint 'll'Jl 92-
1 00, In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., No. 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23. 2003) (briefs 
on file with author). 
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antitrust claims against American Express, arguing that the out-of-pocket 
cost of proving liability will by necessity run into the many hundreds of 
thousands of dollars or more, while the median small merchant stands to 
gain only $5,200.178 
It is not clear to what extent these second-wave challenges will find trac­
tion in the federal courts. I suspect they will find some. What we do know is 
that these arguments are fairly narrow, applying only to federal statutory 
claims in which the unavoidable out-of-pocket costs of proving liability will 
exceed the amount in controversy. 
Finally, a more straight-to-the-jugular challenge to collective action 
waivers is also underway. As discussed above, in the Ross v. Bank of Amer­
ica class litigation, plaintiffs will seek to show that defendants "combined, 
conspired and agreed to implement" collective action waivers in cardholder 
agreements and that such waivers are an anticompetitive restraint on trade.179 
Specifically, plaintiffs allege that defendants' unlawful conspiracy "in­
hibit[s] competition and harm[s] consumers" by giving defendants a "non­
price trade advantage, which would not be available in the absence of con­
certed activity," and which "has resulted in supra-competitive profits by 
shielding [d]efendants from liability arising from any illegal conduct or 
practice."180 This challenge, if successful, could invalidate collective action 
waivers involving consumer credit and charge cards, but would likely have 
little impact in other industries that have independently adopted such waiv­
ers. 
E. The Chimera of Classwide Arbitration 
One question that arises when a collective action waiver is struck 
down-however common or rare an occurrence that may be-is "what hap­
pens to the arbitration clause?" It is perfectly rational to suppose that an 
arbitration clause may be enforceable while a collective action waiver con­
tained within that clause is unenforceable, either because it is 
unconscionable under the circumstances or because it renders a federal sub­
stantive right impossible to vindicate. 
181 One would then suppose, in such a 
1 78. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Compel Arbitration at 14, In 
Re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 03 Civ. 9592 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2003) (arguing that 
"expert witness fees and other out-of-pocket costs that are necessarily incurred in a case of this 
nature, exclusive of class related expenses, are at least $ 1  million," while the median "small mer­
chant plaintiff incurred $ 1 ,75 1 in actual damages during the four-year statutory period, or $5,252 in 
treble damages"). 
1 79. Complaint 'l[ 2, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05-CV-7 1 1  (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
1 80. /d. at 'l[ 1 27. 
1 8 1 .  Courts have traditionally severed unconscionable or unenforceable provisions i n  agree­
ments to arbitrate disputes, thereby allowing the dispute to go to an arbitral panel without the 
offensive terms. See, e.g., Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 289 {3d Cir. 2004) 
(remanding for a determination of whether complained-of provision is unconscionable and must be 
severed); McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 355 F.3d 485, 487 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding unconscionable arbi­
tration provision that gave employer exclusive choice of arbitrators and remanding case to determine 
whether the provision could be severed from the remainder of the agreement); Morrison v. Circuit 
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circumstance, that a court would strike the collective action waiver and yet 
enforce the arbitration clause, sending the case off to class wide arbitration­
a procedure for which all of the major arbitral bodies maintain specific 
rules. 
For a time, this option of court-ordered classwide arbitration looked to 
be a sensible way to show the requisite "healthy regard" for arbitration 
while respecting the value of collective legal action. For example, in Szetela 
v. Discover Bank,182 the California court ruled the collective action waiver 
unconscionable, but then refused to strike the provision altogether; instead, 
it severed the class-waiver provision from the arbitration clause183 and left 
plaintiffs to pursue their claims in a classwide arbitration. 184 Other courts 
faced with arbitration agreements that were silent as to classwide arbitration 
have similarly ordered class claims to proceed in the arbitral forum. 185 
In 2003, however, the Supreme Court took the classwide arbitration 
compromise off the table for federal and state court judges. In Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,186 the Court held that a court may not direct arbi­
trators to entertain an arbitration on a classwide basis where the agreement 
is silent regarding class arbitration; rather, it is uniquely for arbitrators to 
decide whether to allow classwide arbitration.187 
City Stores, Inc., 3 17 F.3d 646, 677 (6th Cir. 2003) (en bane) (finding agreement's cost-sharing 
provision unconscionable and severing unenforceable provisions from the agreement). 
1 82. 1 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App. 2002). 
1 83. Szetela, 1 1 8  Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. 
1 84. The California Supreme Court recently reiterated in Discover Bank, that "[u]nder Cali­
fornia law, . . .  class arbitration may be authorized, even when a contract of adhesion forbids it, 
because a class action waiver may be unconscionable." Discover B ank v. Superior Court, 1 1 3  P.3d 
1 100, l l l5 (Cal. 2005). 
1 85. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1 192, 1 207--08 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that 
individual arbitration of claims would seriously prejudice the interests of plaintiffs, the court or­
dered classwide arbitration to "give expression to the basic arbitration commitment of the parties"); 
Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998); Dickier v. Shearson Leh­
man Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)  (interpreting the words "any controversy" 
in the parties' arbitration agreement to include classwide arbitration); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Sun Life Assurance Co., 210  F.3d 77 1 ,  774-76 (7th Cir. 2000); New Eng. Energy Inc. v. Keystone 
Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 ,  5, 8 (I st Cir. 1988). 
1 86. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
1 87.  The plurality stated that the issue was for the arbitrator because the clause at  issue con­
tained "sweeping language" committing all disputes between the parties to arbitration and granting 
the arbitrator "all powers" provided by the law and the contract. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 45 1 ,  453. The 
plurality also noted that: 
In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts, not arbitrators, 
to decide a particular arbitration-related matter . . . .  They include certain gateway matters, 
such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly 
binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy. 
The question here-whether the contracts forbid class arbitration-does not fall into this nar­
row exception. . . . [T]he relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the 
parties agreed to . . . .  [That question] concerns contract interpretation and arbitration proce­
dures. Arbitrators are well situated to answer that question. 
Id. at 452-53 (citations omitted). But see Peter J. Kreher & Pat D. Robertson Ill, Substance, Proc­
ess, and the Future of Class Arbitration, 9 HARV. NEGOT. L. REY. 409, 422 (2004) ("[T]he Court's 
decision [in Bazzle] represents a significant departure from the prevalent trend in judicial 
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For corporate defendants, then, the Bazzle ruling alleviated the concern 
of judges ordering classwide arbitration, but raised another concern by mak­
ing clear that arbitral bodies are free to order classwide arbitral proceedings.  
It  is  bad enough, from the corporate perspective, to engage in "bet-the­
company" class action litigation without having to sacrifice the appellate 
rights and other safeguards that attend judicial proceedings, including inter­
locutory appeals of class certification decisions. 188 
Predictably, corporate defendants have begun to protect themselves after 
Bazzle by making explicit in all collective action waivers that classwide ar­
bitration is not permissible. 1 89 Articles have appeared in trade journals 
encouraging corporate counsel to "consider supplementing the class action 
waiver . . .  by limiting the arbitrator's authority to resolve individual dis­
putes involving just the plaintiff and the company."190 With that safety-net 
language, even if a court were to invalidate the waiver, leaving the arbitra­
tion clause silent on the question of class treatment, the arbitrator "would 
still be contractually bound to arbitrate nothing more than the plaintiff's 
individual claim." 191 
Somewhat less predictably (or not, depending upon the level of one's 
cynicism) the major arbitral bodies appear to also have ridden to the rescue 
of concerned corporate counsel. The American Arbitration Association 
("AAA")-purportedly based upon its reading of Bazzle-issued a "Policy 
on Class Arbitration" in 2003 that allows its arbitrators to administer class­
wide arbitrations only where "an order of a court directs the parties" to the 
Association. 192 Corporate counsel, however, need not fret: under Bazzle, 
thought. . . .  [as a]ppellate courts [have] traditionally agreed that determination to certify a class 
should lie with trial courts rather than arbitrators."). 
188. See, e.g. , Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Arbitration Update: Green Tree Financial 
Corp. v. B azzle-Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners, 59 Bus. LAW. 1 265, 1 272-73 
(2004) ("Because courts on the whole are vastly more experienced than arbitrators in administering 
class action procedures, most companies faced with the prospect of class arbitration would likely 
prefer to remain in court rather than navigate through the uncharted waters of class-wide arbitra­
tion."); Eric Mogilnicki, Class A rbitration Ruling a Bad Mistake, AM. BANKER, July 15 ,  2005, at 1 7  
("Class arbitration i s  unappealing to businesses because i t  combines the high stakes of class actions 
with the relatively informal procedures found in arbitration. Rules that make sense when individual 
cases are at stake-like limits on appeals-make no sense when hundreds of millions of dollars 
could be at issue."). 
1 89. As one commentator notes, "During oral argument, Justice Stevens opined that Bazzle 
would not have any future significance because 'isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agree­
ments in the future will prohibit class actions?' Indeed, one would expect sophisticated drafters to 
expressly prohibit class arbitration in all post-Bazzle contracts." Avery, supra note 109, at 26; see 
also Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, Using Express No-Class Action Provisions to Halt 
Class-Claims, N.Y. L.J., June 10, 2005, at 3 ("In response to Bazzle, and the non-trivial risk that an 
arbitrator will entertain class or collective actions in the absence of such a clause, many employers 
have begun incorporating explicit 'no-class action' clauses into their employment alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) programs."). 
190. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra note 1 88, at 1 273. 
1 9 1 .  Id. 
1 92. The AAA's classwide arbitration policy provides that pursuant to Bazzle: 
Cnhe American Arbitration Association will administer demands for class arbitration . . .  if 
(I) the underlying agreement specifies that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall 
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no court has the authority to issue such an order in the first place. The 
NAP-which helped develop and promote the collective action waiver in the 
193 • 194 first place -has followed smt. 
In a surprising set of developments, JAMS, the third-largest private arbi­
tral body, 195 announced in November 2004 a new policy to allow class wide 
arbitration even where the arbitration clause explicitly prohibits it. JAMS '  
decision to disavow collective action waivers "was made out o f  concern that 
the prohibitions unfairly curtail the rights of consumers and employees in­
volved in an increasingly large number of class action arbitration claims."196 
The move immediately angered its corporate clientele, some of whom accused 
JAMS of trying to "insert itself as a guardian of social policy" by interfering 
with the freedom to enter into contracts. 197 A number of these clients, includ­
ing Discover and Citibank, swiftly changed their contracts to remove JAMS as 
be resolved by arbitration in accordance with any of the [AAA's] rules, and (2) the agreement 
is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of claims. 
The Association is not currently accepting for administration demands for class arbitration . . .  
unless an order of a court directs the parties to the underlying dispute to submit their dispute to 
an arbitrator or to the Association. 
Am. Arb. Ass'n, Rules and Procedures: American Association Policy on Class Arbitrations, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22254 (last visited Oct. 23, 2005). 
1 93. See supra notes 1 24-125 and accompanying text. 
1 94. In the wake of Bau.le, the NAF created a Class Claim Resolution Program, which pro­
vides for class wide arbitration "(a) by a written agreement between the parties; or (b) by court 
order." NAT'L ARB. FORUM, CLASS CLAIM RESOLUTION PROGRAM (2003), http://www.arb­
forum.com/arbitration/pdfs/Class-Claims-Res-0203.pdf. NAF's position should not be surprising 
given its role in developing and advertising the benefits of collective action waivers to its clients. 
See, e.g. , Complaint 'll'lI 1 2 1-23, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CV 7 1 16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2 1 ,  2005). 
1 95. JAMS, which is headquartered in Irvine, California, handles approximately 30,000 cases 
a year in its twenty-six Resolution Centers around the country, employs more than 1 65 individuals, 
and lists more than 200 full-time neutrals, many of whom are former judges and prosecutors. JAMS 
Won 't Restrict Class Action Right, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., Dec. 29, 2004, at 1 .  In com­
parison, the AAA has thirty-four offices in the United States and Europe, and is widely viewed as 
the industry leader in private arbitration. See Am. Arb. Assoc., About Us, http://www.adr.org/About 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2005). 
196. Justin Scheck, New JAMS Rule Rejects Ban on Class Actions, RECORDER (S.F.), Nov. 15 ,  
2004, at 4. 
1 97.  Sue Reisinger, New JAMS Policy Has Angered GCs, Nat'! L.J., Jan. 24, 2005, at 8. 
Commentators were confounded by the new policy, given that JAMS was certain to lose money if its 
clients decided to go elsewhere for its arbitration needs. Some posited that, in the short term, JAMS 
could realize large fees by acceptance of classwide arbitrations. See Sue Reisinger, GCs Squeeze 
JAMS Over Class Action Rule, RECORDER (S.F.), Jan. 1 8, 2005, at 1 ("[T]the potential costs of arbi­
tration would certainly rise if the process is opened up to include class actions."). It is also possible 
that since the new policy affected only those disputes between consumers and businesses-a small 
number compared to business-to-business arbitrations which make up the bulk of private arbitra­
tion-JAMS may have believed that the financial consequences of it new policy would be minimal, 
while potentially winning it many friends in consumer advocate groups, employment experts, plain­
tiffs' lawyers and others. See, e.g., id. ("Not surprisingly, plaintiff lawyers want the AAA to copy 
JAMS's policy. Cliff Palefsky, a spokesman on arbitration issues for the National Employment Law­
yers Association, says his group has asked the AAA to ignore class action arbitration bans. A partner 
at McGuinn, Hillsman & Palefsky in San Francisco, Palefsky believes that employers have unfairly 
used arbitration as a way to avoid expensive class actions by their employees. Workers, he main­
tains, have more clout in an arbitration when they negotiate as a group than as individuals."). 
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an acceptable forum for arbitrating disputes. 198 Then, in March 2005, in a 
somewhat less surprising move, JAMS abandoned its policy of not enforcing 
class action waivers in arbitration clauses, citing "confusion and concern" 
over how the policy would be applied and criticisms that it undermined the 
neutrality of the arbitration process. 199 More likely, the pressure put on 
JAMS by its corporate clients was too much to bear. 200 
All three of the major arbitral bodies now have official policies that al­
low for classwide arbitration where an underlying agreement explicitly 
provides as much (even if this is unlikely ever to occur), rather than barring 
classwide arbitration altogether. This makes some sense: judges seeking to 
respect an arbitration clause and yet invalidate a class waiver may direct the 
parties to proceed to arbitration with the proviso that, if the arbitrator refuses 
to accord class treatment, the parties may return to court and the arbitration 
provision will be stricken as a whole. Arbitral bodies want to insure against 
this scenario: even in the wake of the recent JAMS tum-around on classwide 
arbitration, it may be that as collective action waivers proliferate, the arbitral 
bodies will see the potential for very large fees generated by their accep­
tance of some classwide arbitrations. While some (and perhaps all, if one 
judges by JAMS '  response) of these bodies will surely determine they are 
better off catering to their repeat corporate clientele, others may perceive a 
market opportunity in accommodating courts seeking ways to balance the 
need for collective action with the policies of the FAA. 
III. THE REACH OF COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS 
The vast potential reach of collective action waivers is, I think, entirely 
unappreciated by courts and commentators. Upon examination, collective 
action waivers have the capacity to derail putative class actions brought un-
1 98. See Erick Bergquist, JAMS Backs Down on Class Action Arbitration, AM. BANKER, Mar. 
I I ,  2005, at I ("Several credit card companies, including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., the Discover 
Financial Services, Inc. unit of Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Inc., informed borrowers recently that 
JAMS would no longer be an option for arbitration."); Mike McKee, What Can Customers Really 
Waive?: Courts to Examine Legality of Arbitration Agreements that Ban Class Actions, RECORDER 
(S.F.), Apr. 7, 2005, at 1 (reporting that Discover and Citibank had written JAMS out of their con­
tracts in protest of the new policy). 
199. Erick Bergquist, supra note 204. 
200. JAMS' decision to reverse its class arbitration policy may also have been affected by the 
ruling in Gipson v. Cross Country Bank, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1 278, 1 289 (M.D. Ala. 2005), in which the 
court found that a JAMS arbitrator had overstepped his authority by ignoring express contractual 
language prohibiting class arbitration. The court also held collective action waivers valid and en­
forceable, id. , a ruling which may have impact on Alabama and Florida state-court determinations 
that such waivers are unconscionable. See, e.g. , Cardegna v. B uckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 
2d 860 (Fla. 2005), cert. granted, 1 25 S. Ct. 2937 (2005); Leonard v. Terminix Int'! Co., 854 So. 2d 
529 (Ala. 2002). As Alan Kaplinsky, an attorney best known for urging his corporate clients to insert 
collective action waivers in their contracts and for defending these waivers against legal challenges, 
self-interestedly noted, "This well-reasoned opinion eviscerates the legal underpinning of the JAMS 
policy . . . .  This will hopefully prompt JAMS to reconsider the wisdom of its policy." Posting to 
http://www.adrinstitute.com/edit/Feb_05/01 3 105Gipson.htm (Jan. 3 1 ,  2005) (quoting Kaplinsky); 
see also Erick Bergquist, Loan Arbitration Clauses Upheld in Appeals Court, AM. BANKER, Feb. 24, 
2005, at 9 (quoting Kaplinsky as saying that the Gipson ruling shows that "JAMS was wrong and 
didn't have the right to determine the validity of class action waivers"). 
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der consumer, antitrust, securities, employment, and civil rights statutes, 
among other areas.201 The waiver is viable wherever a contractual relation­
ship connects the claimant to the defendant. And the nature of the 
contractual relationship required to do the trick has changed tremendously 
in recent years, as we have witnessed an unprecedented judicial willingness 
to find assent in shrink-wrap, scroll-text, and box-stuffer notices, and an 
unprecedented comfort level with "pay-now-terms-later" transactions. 
The potential reach of collective action waivers, then, has been vastly 
extended, as courts have moved from a consent-grounded theory of contract 
to a utilitarian, economist's model, in which overall, systemic efficiency 
gains are more highly valued than the quaint, Williston-era preoccupation 
with volitional assent.202 Whatever one thinks of these developments, the 
implications for collective action waivers are portentous. The project in this 
Part is to explore the reach of the collective action waiver, in large part by 
focusing on shifting judicial notions of consent.203 
A. Locating the Contractual Predicate for Waivers 
Upon examination, it is apparent that sufficient contractual bases for the 
imposition of arbitration clauses and class waivers, under current doctrine, 
are present in virtually all areas of contemporary class action practice. 
201 .  See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering " to Arbitrate Through Pre­
dispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBS., 
Winter/Spring 2004, at 55, 56 ("Arbitration is no longer the province of sophisticated participants. 
Instead, individuals pursuing long-established statutory claims, such as those brought under the 
federal securities and antitrust laws, and newer but long-sought civil rights claims, including race, 
sex, age, and disability discrimination, may now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to 
have assented to a pre-dispute arbitration clause."). 
202. See Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 679, 
679-80 (2004) (noting that standard-form agreements, which epitomize the modem view of con­
tract-without-consent, are economically efficient because they facilitate "mass marketing of goods 
and services by creating one-size-fits-all contracts, the cost of which can be amortized over numer­
ous transactions," "permit sellers more readily to monitor a substantial sales force by avoiding 
variations in contract terms," and "facilitate interpretation both by parties to the contract and third­
party interpreters"). 
Of course, a less benign interpretation of the movement from consent to efficiency might begin 
by observing that the newfound judicial willingness to find offer and acceptance is pretty much 
limited to vertical, top-down contracts imposing arbitration, as opposed to being applicable to all 
efficiency-enhancing transactions, however those might be defined. I am not aware, for example, of 
any trend towards dispensing with traditional requirements of consent in the context of agreements 
between business interests. 
203. Importantly, this project is totally distinct from the liberal or "constitutionalist" critique 
of arbitration agreements, which argues that courts inappropriately apply a private law, objective 
standard of consent in evaluating arbitration agreements instead of the subjective standard that ap­
plies in other contexts (for example, plea bargains or jury waivers for the knowing waiver of the 
constitutional right to a jury trial). That is, the constitutionalist critique, thoughtfully elucidated by 
Professors Jean Stemlight and Stephen Ware, does not accept the application of contract law stan­
dards at all in this area. Here, by contrast, I take them as a given and look to see just where they may 
lead us. See Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 Omo ST. J. ON D1sP. RESOL. 669 (2001);  Stephen J. Ware, 
Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 167. 
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1 .  Consumer Cases 
Other than securities cases, which are discussed separately below, no 
area of law generates more class actions than consumer cases. Consumer 
actions, of course, are hardly monolithic. The term encompasses actions 
against mortgage lenders, credit card companies, commercial banks, and 
others under truth in lending and fair credit statutes; unreasonable charges 
claims against telecommunication carriers under the Federal Communica­
tions Act and state analogues; deceptive trade practices and false advertising 
claims against manufacturers and service providers; and numerous other 
actions. 
An attribute shared by most or all of these consumer actions is a con­
tractual relation, be it direct or via a retailer or middleman, between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. The contractual relation is obvious in most 
cases: for example, cellular-phone service subscribers, mortgagees, and 
credit card holders receive actual, old-fashioned contracts which may con­
tain the collective action waiver.204 It is less obvious that a consumer who 
buys a computer in a box (or a toothbrush, or plane ticket) may have en­
gaged in a transaction effecting the waiver of her right to participate in a 
class action or sue in court. And yet, under current doctrine, there is little 
question that ordinary retail purchases of goods-whether in-store or by 
telephone or internet-may support the imposition of an arbitration clause 
and collective action waiver. 
One leading and somewhat controversial decision on this point comes 
from Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit. In Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc. ,205 a putative consumer class action, the plaintiff bought a com­
puter over the telephone; when it arrived, inside the box was a brand new 
computer, the usual assortment of wires and cables, and a pamphlet contain­
ing "terms and conditions," which included an arbitration clause. This 
document provided that the customer could return the computer within 
thirty days; otherwise, he would be deemed to have agreed to the terms. 
When the computer stopped working two months later and Gateway refused 
to repair or replace it, the plaintiff sued. Gateway defended by pointing to 
the arbitration clause which, it argued, required plaintiff to give up his right 
to sue and instead to take any claims against Gateway to one-on-one arbitra­
tion. 206 
In a decision that encapsulates the move from a consent-based to an effi­
ciency-based theory of contract law, Judge Easterbrook upheld the 
arbitration provision: 
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transpor­
tation, insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical considerations 
204. Demaine & Hensler, supra note 201 ,  at 65-66 (describing a study of consumer contracts 
with included arbitration provisions: 100% explicitly prohibited class actions in a judicial forum, 
and 30% explicitly prohibited classwide arbitration). 
205. 1 05 F.3d 1 147 (7th Cir. I 997). 
206. Hill, 1 05 F.3d at 1 148. 
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support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their prod­
ucts. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers 
before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct­
sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-page statement of 
terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the droning voice 
would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers. Others 
would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time.207 
415 
This excerpt, I think, represents the apotheosis of the economist's ap­
proach to contract law. The only value here is efficiency; consent is 
irrelevant. 208 Judge Easterbrook postulates that the price of establishing 
meaningful consent-in the explicit, meeting-of-the-minds sense of the 
word-would be to grind contemporary commerce to a halt.209 
Whether or not Hill v. Gateway 2000 was rightly decided,2w Judge 
Easterbrook's view reflects the dominant perspective in this area of the 
law.21 1 As a matter of current doctrine, there is nothing to stop a corporate 
defendant from contracting around default legal rules by placing a unilateral 
207. Id. at 1149. 
208. See Gillette, supra note 202, at 681 ("Assent typically reflects some arrangement to 
which there has been mutual agreement created by negotiations or conduct more explicit than open­
ing a box or using a product that is accompanied (unknown to or ignored by the user) by a recitation 
of obligations. If we impose obligations under these circumstances, then we do so in spite of the 
absence of a formal agreement rather than because of it. To the extent we enforce these additional 
terms, we do so because we think that the parties either would or should have agreed to them or to 
terms sufficiently similar that it would not have been cost-effective to bargain for the alternative."). 
209. Id. at 687 (suggesting that store clerks who had to warn consumers that more contract 
terms were coming their way "could undermine the very benefits that rolling contracts purport to 
provide. The ensuing colloquy concerning the forthcoming terms between an inquisitive buyer and 
an operator is more likely to create buyer agitation than enlightenment"). 
210. I rather suspect that if the law required store clerks to read all contract terms in order to 
make them binding, there would simply be no custom terms, beyond price and quantity, in retail 
transactions. There is nothing anomalous about a termless transaction; most transactions fall into 
this category. 
I am not alone in criticizing the Hill decision, and other courts have come out differently on 
similar issues. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105--06 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(refusing to enforce warranty limitations printed on outside of software package, where terms dif­
fered from those in purchase order; treating limitations on package as additional terms proposed by 
manufacturer and never accepted by purchaser); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 
1341 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to enforce terms contained inside a box for a personal computer 
because plaintiffs did not expressly agree to the terms and were not informed of the manufacturer's 
policy that failure to return the computer within five days constituted agreement). 
211. As stated by the district court recently in O'Quin v. Verizon Wireless, L.P., 256 F. Supp. 
2d 512, 516 (M.D. La. 2003): "[O]ther federal and state courts have come to similar conclusions [as 
Judge Easterbrook] under similar factual scenarios, which were all premised on the consumer hav­
ing the opportunity to return the product in order to avoid any term or condition that he found to be 
unacceptable." See also Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2002); 
I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 337-38 (D. Mass. 2002); Moore 
v. Microsoft Corp., 741 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 2002); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 
569, 572 (App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1999). In other words, these courts have found nothing overwhelmingly objectionable in 
the "money now, terms later" approach to sales of consumer goods. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
implicitly bought into this reasoning in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 587 
(1991 ), where it enforced a forum selection clause that was printed on the back of a ticket received 
by passengers in the mail subsequent to a ticket purchase. 
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notice into a computer box, a monthly statement, or any other conduit. 212 It 
makes no difference whether or not the consumer would expect to find terms 
and conditions in these places because consumer expectations have no place 
on this view.2 13 Indeed, even where consumers did not receive arbitration 
provisions in their original consumer contracts, courts have routinely held 
the continued use of a product (such a credit card) or failure to opt-out of a 
waiver (by returning, for example, a computer), indicates assent to all terms 
and conditions. 214 
The import of the reasoning in Hill and other such cases, when coupled 
with judicial solicitude for collective action waivers, is profound. 215 There is 
nothing, as a matter of current law, to prevent companies from unilaterally 
imposing a fully enforceable waiver of the right to collective action in all 
manner of consumer transactions.216 
This means, among other things, that all of the many billions of dollars 
paid in recent years to settle consumer class actions could have been 
avoided; cigarette companies should be kicking themselves (not to mention 
2 1 2. See Gillette, supra note 202, at 682 (noting that cases upholding such unilateral contracts 
"appear motivated by the utility and practicality of easy forms of contracting," while cases refusing 
to enforce these agreements may base their holdings on the failure to find assent, but are "more 
rooted in a conclusion that the practice or the terms that [the contract] generates are offensive than 
in a belief that fealty to contractual rituals is important"). 
2 1 3. Witness Judge Easterbrook's dismissal of the Hill plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish an­
other Seventh Circuit case, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1 447 (7th Cir. 1 996), which gave 
binding effect to an arbitration clause in a software license contained in a box of software diskettes. 
Rejecting the argument that a consumer entering into a software licensing transaction ntight expect 
to encounter such terms, while the purchaser of a consumer good ntight not, Judge Easterbrook 
wrote simply: "Plaintiffs ask us to lintit ProCD to software, but where's the sense in that?" Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1 147, 1 149 (7th Cir. 1997). The lesson is unntistakable: consumer 
expectations have no part in the analysis. 
2 14. One intermediate appellate state court-with no reasoning or analysis whatsoever­
relied on Hill to hold that even where a consumer credit contract ontitted an arbitration clause alto­
gether, the defendant could still invoke arbitration based on a unilateral mass mailer that it 
subsequently sent to its customers, providing that their continued use of the card would constitute 
assent to the new term. Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'! Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478 (App. Div. 2004). On 
this logic-which is not in fact supported by Hill-a bank could send a consumer a bill-stuffer 
notice that if she continues to use her credit card, the bank acquires the right to, say, purchase her 
home. While there exists a body of law governing unilateral change in terms provisions-see infra 
text accompanying notes 248-250--there is clearly no justification for decisions such as Tsadilas, 
which would extend the Hill rule beyond recognition. See also Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 
1 998) (same). 
2 1 5. As one commentator has noted, Judge Easterbrook's decision in Hill essentially "ruled 
that no contract had been formed when the Hills ordered their computer and gave their credit card 
number in payment," but instead, "the terms of Gateway's form contracts deterntined the process of 
offer and acceptance." Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common 
Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 ,  1 9  (2004). As such, Easterbrook "assumed Gateway was only offer­
ing to sell and specifying that the form of acceptance was the Hills' keeping the computer for thirty 
days, even though that 'offer' was not communicated to the Hills at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful fashion--0n the telephone, for example." Id. 
2 1 6. See Gillette, supra note 202, at 689 ("[The main concern about standard-form contracts] 
is that sellers systematically take advantage of their position to draft terms to which informed buyers 
would object. Much of the existing literature perceives SFCs as a zero-sum game in which the 
seller-the only party who participates in the drafting process-seeks to obtain as much as possible 
from the nonreading buyer and thus systematically incorporates proseller terms into the agree­
ment."). 
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their outside counsel) for failing to impose collective action waivers through 
the simple expedient of shrink-wrap text. Indeed, reading Class Action Di­
lemmas, the RAND Institute's  much-cited empirical study, it strikes me that 
each of the consumer-related class action case studies chronicled in the re­
port could have been totally avoided by the imposition of unilateral notices 
with consumer goods.217 Consumers buy goods; goods have packaging; 
packaging may contain waivers of exposure to collective actions; therefore, 
the seller of goods need never be exposed to collective action by consumers. 
2. Antitrust Cases 
The potential reach of collective action waivers in the area of antitrust is 
even more extensive; indeed, it is total. I would venture that all federal anti­
trust class claims-representing a significant percentage of class action 
filings and a large chunk of all settlement dollars-are subject to the waiver, 
for the wholly fortuitous reason that the restrictive antitrust standing rules 
developed over the past twenty-five years ensure that, in the class context, 
the only persons with standing to bring antitrust suits are those with direct 
contractual ties to the defendant, making the imposition of collective action . l 218 waivers e ementary. 
Invariably, antitrust class actions are brought by purchasers of goods or 
services. The paradigmatic antitrust class action nowadays is a suit by pur­
chasers alleging horizontal price-fixing; somewhat less common are the 
cases alleging that some vertical restraint-for example, a tying arrange­
ment or a group boycott-had the effect of restricting competition and 
raising prices.  But either way, antitrust class cases are purchaser cases. Ac­
tions by competitors remain an important source of antitrust enforcement, 
but they do not lend themselves to class treatment: competitor plaintiffs are 
very unlikely to be so numerous as to require class treatment, and, in any 
event, the question of whether any given competitor suffered "antitrust in­
jury" will presumably be too fact-specific to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3). Thus, 
while a competitor antitrust class action would likely be impervious to col­
lective action waivers, given the lack of a contractual nexus, that is a lot like 
saying Martians are impervious to the SARS virus. 
217.  This also applies to companies who do not sell packaged goods directly to consumers. 
For example, in the Contact Lens Pricing Litigation---one of the RAND case studies-defendant 
Bausch & Lomb could have instructed optometrists that its contact lenses may only be distributed to 
the end user with a printed notice containing a collective action waiver. See Hensler et al., supra 
note 1 1 ,  at 145-69. The same is true of manufacturers of blood clotting products for hemophiliacs, 
also featured in the RAND study, who could have required all hospitals which use their product to 
obtain informed consent from patients before treatment. Id. at 293-3 17.  Of course, where the mid­
dleman fails to act as agreed upon, the manufacturer may be relegated to a contract claim against the 
middleman. See id. at 145-69. 
2 1 8. In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that only the "overcharged direct 
purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his 
business or property,' within the meaning of the [antitrust statutes]." 43 1 U.S. 720, 729 (1977); see 
also Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 5 19  
( 1983). 
4 1 8  Michigan La w  Review [Vol. 104:373 
Not only are all antitrust class actions brought by purchasers, but under 
Illinois Brick,2 19 only "direct purchasers"-that is, those that bought directly 
from the antitrust defendant-will have standing to assert federal antitrust 
claims. Downstream purchasers, or "indirect purchasers" in the parlance of 
antitrust, may not bring federal antitrust actions (although some fifteen or so 
states allow indirect purchasers to bring suits under limited circumstances 
under state antitrust laws).220 The upshot is that the only people who can 
bring an antitrust class action in federal court are those upon whom collec­
tive action waivers may most easily and directly be imposed. 
It follows, stunningly, that all of the many billions of dollars paid out in 
antitrust class action settlements and judgments are avoidable. A case-in­
point is the massive tying class action against Visa and MasterCard, which 
ended in 2003 with a record $3.05 billion settlement in favor of a merchant 
class led by Wal-Mart, Circuit City, and others.221 If the Visa/MasterCard 
member banks had simply included collective action waivers in their stan­
dard-form merchant agreements, this mammoth liability would never have 
been incurred.222 B y  contrast, a roughly similar class action filed by small 
merchants in 2003 against American Express may never get off the ground 
for the simple reason that AmEx does include collective action waivers in 
their standard-form merchant agreements.223 
3 .  Civil Rights, Employment, and Entitlement Cases 
In general, civil rights actions are certainly much farther removed from 
contract law than are antitrust or consumer cases. But many contemporary 
civil-rights cases, while not bottomed on contractual theories, implicate con­
tractual relationships that are capable of communicating effective collective 
action waivers.224 
Title VII cases, which have long "typified the sort of civil rights action 
that courts and commentators describe as uniquely suited to resolution by 
class action litigation,"225 often involve a contract-based employment relation-
2 1 9. Illinois Brick, 43 1 U.S. at 729. 
220. See California v. ARC Arn. Corp. ,  490 U.S. 93 ( 1989) (concluding that allowing recovery 
for indirect purchasers under state antitrust laws would not conflict with the policies expressed in 
Illinois Brick). 
22 1 .  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2005). 
222. Of course, Wal-Mart and Circuit City-both plaintiffs in the antitrust litigation-would 
probably not have agreed to a collective action waiver in their negotiations with Visa and Master­
card. While it must be fairly typical to force all types of waivers and other remedy-stripping 
provisions on small merchants, large companies such as these have far greater bargaining power and 
are able to negotiate custom agreements, rather than merely acquiesce to standard-form contracts. 
223. See supra text accompanying notes 1 76-178 (discussing American Express's attempt to 
rely on those collective action waivers in a case currently before the Southern District of New York). 
224. See generally Mara Kent, "Forced" vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 
23 LAW & INEQ. 95 (2005) (reviewing cases and legislation on arbitration of civil rights claims). 
225. Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 813,  8 1 3  (2004). 
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ship. While arbitration of employment disputes i s  nothing new226 (and some 
scholars have staunchly defended the use arbitration in the employment 
context)227 the potential for collective action waivers to curtail most, if not 
all, employment class actions seeking broad-scale changes in the U.S. work­
place is a more recent phenomenon.228 Aggressive employers such as Circuit 
City have already used collective action waivers to avoid classwide exposure 
in the employment context.229 Brokerage houses, which have recently paid 
out high settlements to avoid jury trials in gender-discrimination cases,230 
have long used arbitration clauses to shield themselves from classwide li­
ability in employment claims;23 1 one would expect these entities to soon add 
collective action waivers to ensure their immunity.232 And the newfound abil­
ity of employers to notify employees of arbitration clauses via mass emails 
will make it far easier to impose these waivers.233 Finally, while employment 
226. Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. 
HuM. RTS. L. REV. 29, 30 ( 1998) ("For decades, private arbitration has been the vehicle of choice 
for unions, and it has worked well in this context."). 
227. See, e.g. , Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to A rbitrate Statutory Employment 
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 344 (1997); Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and 
Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 Omo ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 735 
(200 1 ). 
228. See, e.g. , ALAN F. WESTIN & ALFRED G. FELIU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES 
WITHOUT LITIGATION 4-5 (1988); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion 
Employment Disputes?: An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 
369 (1995). Some commentators have argued that arbitration has enormous benefits for employees 
because it is cheaper and faster than litigation. These studies have typically focused on individual 
claims such as wrongful discharge, rather than class-based claims. 
229. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (200 1 )  (endorsing mandatory arbitration 
of employment claims); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1990) (same); see 
also Miriam A. Cheny, Whistling In the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implica­
tions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1 078-79 (2004) 
("[C]ourts have shifted from viewing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contracts with suspicion to 
distinctly favoring them. In part this can be explained by the fact that enforcing mandatory arbitra­
tion contracts frees the federal courts from having to deal with a considerable volume of 
employment litigation."). However, in California, Circuit City's attempts to impose collective action 
waivers on employees have twice been rebuffed by the federal courts on unconscionability grounds. 
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v Mantor, 335 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2003); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 
Inc., 328 F.3d 1 1 65 (9th Cir. 2003). 
230. See, e.g. , Emily Thornton with Mara Der Hovanesian & Jennifer Merritt, Fed up-and 
Fighting Back, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 2004, at 100 (reporting on a number of high-profile gender 
discrimination suits against Wall Street brokerage houses, including the record $54 million dollar 
settlement of such claims by Morgan Stanley). 
23 1 .  Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 60 1 N.Y.S.2d 686 (App. Div. 1993), cert. denied, 5 1 0  
U.S. 993 (1 993) (compelling arbitration o f  race- and gender-discrimination claims brought against a 
brokerage firm). 
232. There is already authority for the proposition that brokerage firms may enter into private 
agreements with employees that bypass the current regulatory regime. For example, in Credit Suisse 
First Boston, LLC v. Padilla, 326 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the court held that brokerage 
firms may enter into agreements with employees that replace arbitration by a self-regulating organi­
zation (such as the NYSE or NASO) with arbitration by the AAA, NAF, or JAMS. But see Credit 
Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Pitofsky, 768 N.Y.S.2d 436 (App. Div. 2003) (finding that SEC rules 
require self-regulating organization arbitration for employment disputes against all member firms). 
233. See Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d 546 ( 1 st Cir. 2005). In 
Campbell, a former employee sued for wrongful discharge under the Americans With Disabilities 
420 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:373 
suits are seemingly immune from collective action waivers where based on 
at-will rather than a contractual relationship, there is little to stop employers 
from forming contracts containing "at-will" terms and collective action 
• 234 waivers. 
Title IX cases (regarding education) are likewise amenable to collective 
action waivers. There is no reason, for example, why educational admissions 
materials could not include the waiver. The same goes for the leases, mort­
gages, and other contracts that tie the plaintiffs in Fair Housing Act cases to 
the defendants in those actions. Nor is there any doctrinal reason-given the 
state of current law-why government entities could not avail themselves of 
waivers to avoid class action liability in a broad array of cases, including 
employment, housing, entitlement, and education-related class actions. 
Political constraints are another matter: I imagine that many government 
officials would not be comfortable opting out of the government's own dis­
pute-resolution system. But I can also imagine this sentiment changing-at 
least insofar as class actions are concerned-as waivers in other areas be­
come more common, and as opportunistic politicians seize upon an easy 
issue ("My opponent is for big class actions against the taxpayers; I 'm 
against them !").235 
Of course, there are other civil rights cases that do not implicate contrac­
tual relations, including cases concerning prison conditions, taxation, 
zoning, police misconduct, and so forth. While many types of civil rights 
actions have become very difficult to maintain, owing to the Prison Litiga­
tion Reform Act, the restrictive "equitable standing rule," and other 
Act. The defendant moved to compel arbitration arguing that the employee was bound by a manda­
tory arbitration clause included in a company-wide email. The court held the arbitration clause had 
not been agreed to, but strongly suggested that all that was needed to make such a clause effective 
was to require a response acknowledging receipt and acceptance of the new policy. Id. 
234. Not that employers haven't tried to insert such waivers into employee handbooks or other 
materials, but courts have been surprisingly sharp in determining whether employment manuals and 
other "orientation day" detritus containing arbitration clauses are valid. See, e.g., Ramirez-de­
Arellano v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 133 F.3d 89, 90 ( ! st Cir. 1 997); Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper 
Corp., 1 19 F.3d 756, 76 1-62 (9th Cir. 1997); Gallos v. FIC Am. Corp., No. 02 C 6328, 2003 WL 
2 1 804258, at * 1 -2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1 4, 2003); Phox v. Atriums Mgmt. Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1 279, 
1 282-83 (D. Kan. 2002); Snow v. BE&K Constr. Co., 1 26 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. Me. 2001 ); Trumbull v. 
Century Mktg. Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 683, 685-86 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Phox v. Allied Capital Advis­
ers, Inc., 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 809, 8 1 0  (D.D.C. 1997). 
235. To some extent, this issue has come up with Government-Sponsored Enterprises 
("GSEs"). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, both congressionally chartered companies, guarantee 
mortgage-backed securities in order to maintain liquidity and stability in the secondary mortgage 
market. In response to concerns by consumer groups and others, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
announced in 2004 that they would cease purchasing mortgage loans that contained mandatory 
arbitration clauses. Fannie Goes to Bat for Buyers, BAt.T. SUN, Oct. 1 0, 2004 at IL ("While Fannie 
Mae does not believe arbitration provisions are inherently abusive, we believe that mandatory arbi­
tration can be used in an abusive fashion" (quoting a Fannie Mae spokesperson). These actions 
prompted a number of private mortgage lenders to follow suit. See Erick Bergquist, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 3 1 , 2005 at I (reporting that the decision by Wells Fargo, Citibank, and Countrywide Financial 
Services to stop using collective action waivers was "largely caused by the decision last year by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to no longer buy loans with such clauses"). 
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developments,236 such cases are, I think, impervious to class action waivers, 
and so form an irreducible stump of class action practice. 
4. Other Commercial Cases 
Other major areas of class action practice include-for lack of a better 
term---commercial cases in which the claimants challenge the defendant's 
practices under, say, an insurance agreement (such as the numerous class 
filings aimed at Marsh & McLennan, piggybacking on the investigation by 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer)237 or a franchise agreement (wit­
ness the infamous Meineke Muffler verdict of one hundred million dollars, 
which inspired the movement to look to arbitration as a way of insuring 
against large class action verdicts).238 Clearly-indeed, paradigmatically­
such cases lend themselves to collective action waivers. 
It is also possible that, at some point, collective action waivers could re­
strict class actions in cases against securities firms. Currently, customer 
claims against broker-dealers are governed by rules promulgated and admin­
istered by the various exchanges. The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASO") have thus 
adopted procedures for the arbitration of customer claims which prohibit 
class claims in the arbitral forum, but also bar member firms from enforcing 
an arbitration agreement against a customer who has initiated a class action 
in court. 239 In approving these rules, the Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion ("SEC") opined that: 
[C]lass actions are better handled by courts and . . .  investors should have 
access to the courts to resolve class actions efficiently. In the past, 
individuals who attempted to certify class actions in litigation were subject 
to the enforcement of their separate arbitration contracts by their broker­
dealers. Without access [to] class actions in [appropriate] cases, both 
236. See Gilles, supra note 1, at 1 414. 
237. In 2004, Spitzer sued Marsh & McClennan Companies, the nation's largest insurance 
brokerage firm, for bid-rigging and price-fixing. As of this writing, the investigation continues, and 
thus far, two Marsh & McClennan executives have pleaded guilty to criminal charges. See generally 
Marcia Vickers, The Secret World of Marsh Mac, Bus. WK., Nov. 1 ,  2004, at 78 (discussing 
Spitzer's investigation and the "several class actions" that sprung up in the aftermath of the attorney 
general's announcement). 
While insurance-contract class actions are, by and large, vulnerable to the waiver, one area of 
class action litigation sure to survive any proliferation of collective action waivers is found in insur­
ance claims under the laws of Kansas, Georgia, and a handful of states that have enacted statutes 
expressly prohibiting the arbitration of claims arising out of insurance disputes under the authority 
granted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 101 (2004). See, e.g., Mut. Reins. Bureau v. 
Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 93 1 ,  933 ( 10th Cir. 1992) (finding Kansas statute expressly 
invalidating arbitration clause contained in insurance contract was not preempted by the FAA). Such 
state laws have been held not to be preempted by the FAA. See, e.g., McKnight v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 
358 F.3d 854, 857 (1 l th Cir. 2004) ("In the right circumstances, the McCarran-Ferguson Act pro­
vides an exception to the general rule of arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act."). 
238. See supra note 1 2 1  (discussing the multimillion dollar verdict against Meineke Motors). 
239. See Arbitration Rules: Rules 600-639, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE, at 'l[ 2600, 
Rules 600(d), 636 (2004); Code of Arbitration Procedure, NASO MANUAL, at 'lI 3710, §§ 1 2(d)(2), 
1030l (d)(l )  (2004); see also Nielsen v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 66 F.3d 145 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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investors and broker-dealers have been put to the expense of wasteful, 
duplicative litigation. 240 
But there is nothing to keep broker-dealers from including a collective 
action waiver in their contracts with customers. If they were to do so, cus­
tomers would be unable to bring class actions in court and would instead be 
forced to bring individual claims in the NYSE or NASD's arbitral forum. 
And the current regulation, prohibiting exchange members from enforcing 
an arbitration agreement against a class member, would be rendered mean­
ingless. 
Another burgeoning area of commercial class action litigation that may 
be vulnerable to collective action waiver are claims arising under ERISA, 
including suits against corporate pension trustees which shadow securities­
fraud cases.241 In these ERISA class actions, employees and retirees allege 
that the company and its directors breached their fiduciary duties by know­
ingly issuing false financial statements, which induced employees or their 
ERISA plan fiduciary to invest and maintain their plan assets in company 
stock at artificially high prices. ERISA class actions against Enron, World­
Com, and other infamous corporate debacles have been filed by employees 
whose retirement and stock savings plans were heavily invested in the com­
pany's now-decimated stock.242 But, as with broker-dealer agreements, there 
is no doctrinal reason why pension documents could not contain collective 
action waivers ; corporate fund managers just haven't adapted yet. Given the 
current state of the law, there would seem to be no reason why pension trus­
tees (and indeed, all fund managers) would not wake up and insulate 
themselves from billions of dollars in potential class liabilities. 
5 .  The Special Case of Securities Fraud 
While the advent of collective action waivers may soon doom the avail­
ability of class actions against Wall Street brokerages, fund managers, and 
other investment professionals, the undisputed king of the class action jun­
gle is the Rule lOb-5 suit against a securities issuer by plaintiffs who 
240. Exchange Act Release No. 34-3 1 37 1 ,  57 Fed. Reg. 52,659, at 52,661 (Nov. 4, 1 992). 
24 1 .  Nowadays, when an Enron or WorldCom scandal strikes, not only do the company's 
stockholders have a viable class claim against the corporation and its agents, but the company's 
pensioners often have an equally viable claim against the pension "plan fiduciary," which is gener­
ally a committee with membership that overlaps with that of the company's board. As many 
journalists have noted, there has been a disturbing trend in recent years of plan fiduciaries investing 
significant portions-sometimes 1 00%--of fund assets in the stock of the corporation. See Mary 
Williams Walsh & Jonathan D. Glater, Pension Fund Trustees Taking Aim at Safeway, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 26, 2004, at C4. And of course, where the plan fiduciary body contains the company's CEO or 
other insiders, it is chargeable with knowledge of the wrongful activities of the company. As a result, 
the emergence of ERISA suits as a follow-on to major securities fraud suits is becoming more and 
more common. See Mary Williams Walsh, Concerns Raised over Consultants to Pension Funds, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2 1 ,  2004, at I .  
242. See, e.g. , In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litig., 263 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative and "ERISA" Litig., No. MDL-1446 Civ.A H-01 -3624, 2002 WL 
3 1 845 1 1 4  (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002). 
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purchased shares on the open market.243 And here, on the surface at least, it 
would appear the class action's march towards extinction breaks its stride in 
a meaningful way. In particular, it would appear that collective action waiv­
ers are impotent to penetrate the realm of classic l Ob-5 litigation. There is 
simply no contractual relationship of any kind between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. The corporate issuer of securities contracts only with a syndicate 
of brokers, and even then only when it has a public offering. Remaining 
sales are transacted on a secondary market between strangers. 
And yet, the classic securities fraud case may nonetheless be ripe for in­
filtration by collective action waivers. To appreciate how this could happen, 
it is necessary to look critically at the structure of other transactions in 
which courts have enthusiastically located enforceable arbitration agree­
ments and collective action waivers. Courts following the reasoning 
exemplified in Judge Easterbrook's Hill decision have not hesitated to rec­
ognize binding arbitration clauses that obligate a plaintiff-consumer to 
arbitrate claims against a defendant-manufacturer, where the clause was 
contained inside (or on) a box that she bought at a third party retailer.244 On 
this three-sided model, there is not necessarily any contract between con­
sumer and manufacturer (although there may be a warranty or some ongoing 
service component); the only real contract is between the consumer and re­
tailer. All that really matters to the court is that the consumer acts (or 
refrains from acting) while on notice that the terms and conditions estab­
lished by the manufacturer include arbitration. It is a fiction to speak of an 
"agreement" to arbitrate between the plaintiff and the manufacturer, al­
though courts often do.245 What judges really mean is that the manufacturer 
243. As Professor Sternlight explains: 
[T]he securities industry has long been a major proponent and advocate of binding arbitration 
in general, its policies foreclose arbitration of class actions and instead allow investors to 
litigate such claims. In adopting the exclusion . . . the SEC foreclosed the possibility that 
companies might be permitted to deprive customers of the class action device simultaneously 
in both litigation and arbitration forums. The rule barring arbitral class actions was 
unanimously adopted in I 992 by the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA"). 
One by one the various individual brokerages secured SEC approval for the same rule. 
The SEC opposed arbitration of class actions because whereas courts already had developed 
rules for handling class actions, arbitral organizations had not. It found that allowing arbitra­
tion of class actions would be wasteful and duplicative. In approving later versions of the 
exclusion of class actions from arbitration, the SEC frequently reiterated that it "is an impor­
tant initiative to protect investors and the public interest." 
Sternlight, supra note I O I ,  at 45-48 (footnotes omitted). 
244. See, e.g., Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Clarke, 862 So. 2d 634 (Ala. 2003) (compelling arbitra­
tion of claim brought by mobile home purchaser against manufacturer, even where manufacturer 
was not party to the retail installment contract in which the arbitration clause appeared). 
245. In Ross v. Bank of America, for example, plaintiff cardholders allege that they never 
entered into valid and binding agreements to arbitrate disputes: 
While defendants agreed between and among themselves to impose arbitration clauses, plain­
tiffs and other members of the class did not affirmatively agree to accept them. Defendants 
imposed the arbitration clauses on their cardholders in a manner designed to avoid detection by 
cardholders. The clauses were either engrafted onto existing cardholder agreements through 
change in terms notices or buried in the cardholder agreements of new cardholders. By hiding the 
arbitration clauses in change in terms announcements and cardholder agreements, defendants did 
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clearly announced the terms and conditions that attach to its product, and 
the consumer-on notice of those terms-accepted the product or elected 
not to return it. The requirement of privity is replaced by a "notice-plus-
246 
acceptance" test. 
So if I am right-if we are entering a world where the requisite "agree­
ment" to arbitrate is satisfied by notice-plus-acceptance of the product­
then the door may be open just wide enough to impose collective action 
waivers in the classic l Ob-5 fraud-on-the-market context, provided that there 
is sufficiently clear notice. And clear notice shouldn't be very difficult at all. 
I can imagine, for example, a NASDAQ website listing companies who have 
elected to "opt out" of class action exposure. Perhaps (somewhat formalisti­
cally) courts would require securities to bear legends reflecting the opt out. 
Certainly, actual notice could easily be provided by issuers to the stock ex­
changes, investment banks, and brokerage houses, all of which might be 
obligated to notify their customers in some broad fashion. Ultimately, com­
panies could simply amend their corporate charters to give notice of the 
collective action waiver.247 
Now, lest we get ahead of ourselves, there are strains of recent case law 
that push back against the creep towards a "notice-plus-acceptance" test for 
arbitration agreements. This issue comes up, for example, in cases where 
companies send out unilateral amendments to consumers under "change-in­
terms" provisions-that is, contractual clauses that give companies the right 
to alter the terms of the agreement on written notice to the consumer. Some 
lower courts in recent years have refused to compel arbitration where an 
arbitration provision was sent to the consumer pursuant to a "change-in­
terms" provision, reasoning that the addition of a new provision requiring 
not reasonably inform their cardholders of the arbitration clauses or their consequences. Either 
way, Plaintiffs and other members of the Class did not "agree" to the arbitration clauses. The 
clauses are never signed by any "party" to them. Silence on the part of cardholders is not evi­
dence of an "agreement" to arbitrate. 
Complaint 'll'l! 1 25-26, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CV 7 1 1 6  (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2 1 ,  2005). 
246. Professor Stephen Ware describes this as a "hub-and-spoke" version of contracting: 
[A]utomobile insurance companies could have an enormous impact on negligence law if all 
their insurance policies had arbitration clauses making all the company's other policyholders 
third-party beneficiaries. Then an auto accident involving, for instance, two Allstate customers 
would go to arbitration, not litigation. If all the insurers contracted with each other, they could 
extend this arbitration system to accidents involving customers of different insurers . . . .  Nor 
would insurers have to be the only hub of hub-and-spoke arbitration agreements. A magazine 
could be a hub with spokes connecting all its subscribers. Mastercard could be a hub with 
spokes connecting all its cardholders. 
Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 703, 752 (1 999) (footnote omitted). 
24 7. Under Delaware law (and the law of many other states as well) corporations may amend 
their corporate charters to insulate themselves from liability for breach of the duty of care. These 
"waivers" are binding against all shareholders. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (2003). This could 
prove to be a sufficient statutory basis for imposing a collective action waiver. 
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arbitration goes well beyond the alteration of existing contractual terms, 
which would be a permissible "change-in-terms."248 
Numerous other courts, however, have reached a contrary result,249 and, 
even more significantly, Delaware (whose law would be designated to con­
trol the contracts of any Delaware-chartered bank or corporation) has 
enacted a statute that expressly authorizes the addition of arbitration clauses 
through change-in-terms provisions.250 
In the end, then, I think the cases refusing to recognize unilaterally im­
posed arbitration clauses are no more than speed bumps on a road inevitably 
leading away from traditional contract principles in the area of arbitration.25 1  
Courts have already recognized a number of circumstances under which 
nonsignatories may be bound to arbitration agreements, including the as­
sumption by a nonparty of rights and responsibilities under a contract that 
contains an arbitration clause.252 This is not a distant leap from a doctrine 
holding that a collective action waiver "travels with the stock," as part of the 
basket of rights purchased by the shareholder in the open market when he 
purchases a company's common stock. 
B .  How the Waiver May Come to Rule the Earth 
It seems inevitable that more and more companies will come to under­
stand that class action exposure is largely optional under current doctrine. 
The penetration of collective action waivers is relatively miniscule today, 
248. See Stone v. Golden, Wexler & Samese, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1 89 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); Perry v. 
FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 04-507, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12616 (E.D. Pa. July 6, 2004); Long v. 
Fid. Water Sys., Inc., No. C-97-201 1 8, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7827, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 
2000); Badie v. B ank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998); Discover Bank v. Shea, 827 
A.2d 358 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Sears Roebuck and Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.2d 424, 426 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
249. See Bank One, N.A. v. Williams, No. 3:01 CV24-D-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2721 7  
(N.D. Miss. April 30, 2002); Bank One v. Coates, 1 25 F. Supp. 2 d  8 1 9  (S.D. Miss. 2001) ,  aff'd 
without opinion, No. 0 1-60059, 34 Fed. Appx. 964 (5th Cir. April 5, 2002) (Ohio law); Herrington v. 
Union Planters Bank of Miss., 1 13 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Miss. 2000), aff'd without opinion, 265 
F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 2001) ;  Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1 4 10 (M.D. Ala. 1998) 
(relying in part on Alabama and Utah statutes that permit unilateral amendment but do not refer 
explicitly to whether that method can be used to add an arbitration clause); SouthTrust Bank v. 
Williams, 775 So. 2d 1 84 (Ala. 2000) (Alabama statute permits unilateral amendment but does not 
address whether arbitration clause can be added this way); Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 
N.E.2d 886, (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (Arizona law). 
250. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2005) (Delaware statute expressly authorizes addi­
tion of arbitration clause through this method). 
25 1 .  And of course, as collective action waivers proliferate over time, there will be less need 
to impose such clauses through unilateral change-in-terms provisions. Such unilateral amendments 
simply accelerate the pace at which the waivers may become commonplace. 
252. The Second Circuit, for example, has thus far recognized five theories for binding non­
signatories to arbitration agreements: 1 )  incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 
4) veil-piercing/alter-ego; and 5) estoppel. See Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. P'ship, Inc. v. Smith 
Cogeneration Int'!, Inc.,  198 F.3d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1 999); Thomson-CSP, S.A. v. Am. Arb. Ass'n, 64 
F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1 995); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 265 F. Supp. 2d 385, 
401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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but the visible tip represents a whopping and seemingly unavoidable ice­
berg. 
Several factors will conspire to speed the waiver's rise. For one, in the 
wake of Bazzle and the announcement by all three major arbitral bodies that 
their arbitrators may not sua sponte order classwide arbitration, most com­
panies that have arbitration clauses in their contracts with consumers or 
employees suddenly, automatically, have collective action waivers as well.253 
Second, the ability of companies to unilaterally impose waivers via change­
in-terms provisions under the law of Delaware and other key states has been 
a huge boon to many of the largest banks and other institutions that regu­
larly face broad exposure to consumers, allowing the banks to impose these 
terms on existing (and not just new) relationships. 
Another factor here is the tight-knit business lobby, with their regular 
conferences and publications, all of which grease the skids for the fast de­
velopment of procorporate legal ideas, once they reach a certain tipping 
point. And I do expect a tipping point, where it becomes perfectly clear to 
the broader business community that their interests demand the full-scale 
imposition of collective action waivers in all of the ways discussed above 
and others not yet considered. Most likely, this watershed moment will be 
precipitated by a major court decision-for example, if AmEx earns a free 
pass through its collective action waivers, whereas Visa and MasterCard 
were forced to pay $3 billion. 
One might ask: why hasn't this happened yeti54 I am not entirely sure, 
but I offer a few observations. First, the collective action waivers are of 
fairly recent vintage, and have not been much tested by appellate courts. 
Relatedly, I think these waivers are fairly counterintuitive to liberally trained 
lawyers: a common reaction is "that can't be permissible." So I suspect there 
is some reluctance on the part of general counsel to rush into a perceived 
violation of applicable law. I also suspect that, for some fairly small subset 
of companies-the Ben & Jerry's of the world-the imposition of a collec­
tive action waiver in contracts with employees or consumers might serve to 
undermine the company's investment in its public image and good will.255 
253. See supra text accompanying notes 189-196 (discussing the response by the three major 
arbitral bodies to the Supreme Court's ruling in Green Tree). 
254. Again, it is entirely possible that many more companies have inserted collective action 
waivers into their contracts and onto their packaging materials in recent years. But impressionisti­
cally, it appears that the early adopters have been fairly sophisticated entities; full penetration of the 
waiver, then, is not yet complete. Indeed, current data indicate that even standard predispute arbitra­
tion clauses are not as common as one would imagine. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 201 ,  at 
56 (finding that among the consumer contracts studied, only those in the financial services industry 
consistently contained arbitration clauses); Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 
2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695 (finding that less than half the franchise agreements studied contained 
arbitration clauses). 
255. See supra note 235 (discussing announcement by congressionally chartered governmen­
tal corporations refusing to accept mortgages containing mandatory arbitration clauses in effort to 
befriend consumer rights organizations). 
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Other possible rationales are less convincing. While certification of a 
settlement-only class is sometimes a useful way to achieve global peace,256 it 
seems unlikely that a company would expose itself to class liability just to 
keep that option open-after all, if this option were so important, firms 
could provide in their contracts that the parties waive the right to participate 
in all collective actions except for settlement classes.257 
Nor do I believe that firms refrain from imposing waivers to cause buy­
ers to pay more today for the right to litigate collectively tomorrow. Such an 
argument assumes, for one thing, that consumers are aware of the existence 
of collective action waivers.258 They're clearly not.259 And even if they were, 
it is not clear that consumers would attach a negative value to the waivers at 
the time of contracting. I rather expect that, viewed ex ante, the prospect of 
class litigation always appears very remote-and certainly too remote to 
affect the price of the product. 2
60 
But none of this explains why arbitration agreements are not currently 
in wider use in consumer and even employee agreements.2
61 My own view is 
that, before the collective action waiver issue arose, arbitration did not mat­
ter all that much. Sure, there is value for companies in being in arbitration 
as opposed to litigation,262 but the avoidance of class actions is a much big­
ger deal. And so, previously, there was no overwhelming incentive to push 
the envelope by, for example, including arbitration agreements on shrink­
wrap or in packaging; or by issuing written "at-will" employment contracts 
to hourly employees containing arbitration clauses. Now there is. 
256. See, e.g. , Judith Resnik, Statement Prepared for Public Hearings Considering Proposed 
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23: Procedural Challenges: Revising the Class Action Rule, at 12 
(Jan. 22, 2002) (on file with author) (noting that "some defendants have come to welcome certifica­
tion of a class as a useful tool for them to reach closure on a set of problems of a plaintiff class"). 
257. It is also striking that the companies with the most to gain from settlement classes­
phone companies, credit card companies, and the like-are precisely the firms that have decided 
most aggressively to implement collective action waivers. 
258. It also assumes, quite implausibly, that marketers would trumpet the possibility that the 
consumer might some day wish to engage in class action litigation against the company. 
259. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that consumers rarely read contracts, or 
understand the various terms and conditions which they "agree" to when purchasing goods and 
services. See generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1 1 73 (1983). These informational asymmetries only become starker with the increas­
ing tendency of companies to place the terms and conditions of sale in scroll-text, envelope stuffers, 
and other such media. See also Complaint CJ[ 3, Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CV 7 1 1 6  (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 2 1 ,  2005) (asserting that "most cardholders are wholly unaware of the existence, Jet alone the 
implications, of the arbitration clauses"). 
260. There is a rich behavioral economics literature on the consumer's ability to discount the 
future in ways that may end up appearing irrational. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Be­
havioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1 55 1 ,  1 568 ( 1 998). 
261 .  See generally Demaine & Hensler, supra note 201 ;  Drahozal, supra note 254. 
262. Reisinger, supra note 1 97, at 8 (noting that general counsels "have Jong relied on arbitra­
tion as a way to keep legal costs down since it's traditionally been viewed as cheaper than 
litigation"). 
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C. Political and Policy Considerations 
I have made clear my view that courts are likely to prove hospitable to 
collective action waivers for as far as the eye can see. Judicial attitudes do 
change, as we have seen, but they change slowly. The views of Judges Pos­
ner and Easterbrook on the legal issues discussed in this Article may rule the 
roost today, but they were decades in the hopper. Certainly, I do not see any 
judicial attitude shift in the offing that would cause courts to swing back to a 
more consent-centric view of contract or to elevate the interest of compen­
sating small plaintiffs over concerns with overbearing settlement pressures. 
Another possible limiter here is Congress, which could pass legislation 
providing that the procedures of Rule 23 may not be waived, or may not be 
waived in a standard-form agreement. While such an approach surely has 
the virtues of clarity and efficiency, the issue is likely moot for the time be­
ing: the 2004 election results make it unlikely that Congress will be 
disposed to curtail the ability of companies to opt out of classwide exposure 
any time soon (although it is certainly possible that, as part of the horse­
trading to be carried out in a major litigation reform package, class action 
anti-waiver legislation could come into play).263 
It is also theoretically possible that, should the waiver continue to sur­
vive legal challenges and fail to inspire legislative attention, the executive 
branch might step in to fill the enforcement vacuum created by an absence 
of collective litigation. 264 Courts, in upholding the validity of collective ac­
tion waivers, seem to derive comfort from the abstract notion that "[e]ven if 
plaintiff cannot bring a class action, the Attorney General . . .  [could] bring 
an action to enforce" the plaintiff's and other similarly situated claimants' . 
h 265 ng ts. 
263. From the perspective of trial lawyers and their Democratic allies, agreeing to litigation 
reform proposals would seem a small price to pay for obtaining an antiwaiver amendment to Rule 
23. Whether they will correctly perceive the relative value of antiwaiver legislation, however, is 
anybody's guess. I am likewise not sure that businesses and their Republican allies will correctly 
appreciate the stakes. Certainly, the relatively scant attention paid to collective action waivers to date 
makes me think that it is still possible for either side to make a monumental mistake in evaluating a 
measure that could, by and large, determine the future viability of class action litigation. See 
Stemlight, supra note IOI ,  at 15- 1 6  ("It is rather amazing that, despite its clear importance, the 
phenomenon of using arbitration to avoid class actions has received scant public attention. It has not 
been focused upon in Congress, in the popular press, or even among arbitration scholars. For exam­
ple, the relationship between class actions and binding arbitration has not been addressed in the 
[FAA] or in the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). Similarly, no state arbitration statute contains 
specific provisions dealing with the treatment of class actions." (footnotes omitted)). 
264. Professor Resnik, in a statement prepared for hearings considering proposed amend­
ments to Rule 23, noted that, should the executive branch step in, "the reliance on the private bar for 
such regulatory work could be reduced." Resnik, supra note 256, at 14 (discussing a 1979 Justice 
Department proposal "for legislation to authorize it to bring small dollar value claims on behalf of 
injured individuals"). 
265. Tsadilas v. Providian Nat'! Bank, 786 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App. Div. 2004); see also 
Iberia Credit Bureau v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., 379 F.3d 1 59, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
Louisiana state statute that allows the state attorney general to intervene as a plaintiff on behalf of 
consumers). 
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In any event, assuming that collective action waivers ever do receive 
critical attention in Congress or the executive branch, the binary political 
question presented is: are collective action waivers a good thing or a bad 
thing? And the antecedent theoretical question is, what set of norms does 
one draw on to decide whether we ought to allow waiver of collective ac­
tion? 
Certainly, we can anticipate a boilerplate economic argument in favor of 
recognizing collective action waivers, asserting that class action exposure 
entails costs, and that consumers-given the choice-may opt to waive their 
right to collective action if that meant cheaper goods and services. But the 
standard economic critique is totally unilluminating here: consumers may 
very well opt for the lower prices and sign the waiver. But if we buy this 
argument, then why not allow companies to require consumers (and em­
ployees and pensioners and so forth) to waive all prospective liability (or, 
say, a waiver of liability under TILA, or Title VII, or ERISA, or the 
Sherman Act) in exchange for a reduction on price, or a bump up in wages, 
or what have you? Consumers will do it; I take that as a given.266 But current 
legal doctrine doesn't allow it: as a matter of public policy, we prohibit pro­
spective waivers of federal statutory liability. 267 
We are therefore left with policy questions that must be answered on 
their own terms: shall we allow, in standard-form agreements, broad waivers 
of prospective substantive statutory liability? Waivers of the right to seek 
money damages, or injunctive relief? Of the right to proceed collectively? 
Each of these deserves a real answer. 
CONCLUSION 
The question on the table here-whether to enforce collective action 
waivers-totally and inevitably collapses into the question of whether class 
actions are a good thing or a bad thing. After all, on what theory might we 
uphold the right of companies to broadly impose collective action waivers, 
and yet oppose the repeal (or radical overhaul) of Rule 23 itself? The obvi­
ous answer, in any other context, would be freedom-of-contract principles. 
But here, the freedom-of-contract answer is unavailable. It was not "con­
sent" or a "meeting of minds" that Judge Easterbrook found lying on the 
bottom of a computer box in Hill v. Gateway 2000; it was economic effi­
ciency. 
266. See, e.g. , Lary Lawrence, Toward a More E;fficient and Just Economy: An Argument for 
Limited Enforcement of Consumer Promises, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 815,  817 ,  824-25 (1987) (discussing 
asymmetric information, unequal bargaining power, and irrational consumer preferences). 
267. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 n.19 
( 1985); see also David Schwartz, supra note 1 12, at 53-54 ("Under common law principles and 
numerous statutes, prospective waivers of substantive rights are generally disfavored . . . .  Courts 
generally refuse to enforce contract clauses whose effect is to exempt a party from liability for its 
own future fraud or intentional torts, violations of statute, and injuries caused by gross negligence or 
recklessness. Common law doctrine is particularly restrictive of prospective waivers where a regu­
lated party seeks to limit its liability to the party benefiting from the regulation-such as consumer 
or employment contracts." (citations omitted)). 
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And so, we are back to the question of whether having class actions at 
all is efficient or desirable. To a large extent, the answer to this question de­
pends on one's view of the values that collective action litigation promotes 
in our legal system. 
My intuition, again, is that class actions do far more good than harm; that 
many prudent corporate decisions are made precisely because the palpable 
threat of class action liability hangs in the boardroom. I think it also indisput­
able that class actions serve a vital compensatory goal: in most cases, class 
members "would not likely have received any monetary compensation absent 
a class action."
268 
As the Supreme Court recognized thirty years ago in Eisen 
v. Carlisle & Jacquelin: 
A critical fact in this litigation is that petitioner's individual stake in the 
damages award he seeks is only $70. No competent attorney would under­
take this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an amount. 
Economic reality dictates that petitioner's suit proceed as a class action or 
not at all. 269 
The use of class actions to fight racial discrimination, achieve equality 
in the workplace, and tackle consumer fraud illustrates that these suits can 
achieve public goals, both by compensating victims and deterring future 
wrongful conduct. For these reasons, and because no genuine freedom-of­
contract interests are served by collective action waivers, my own view is 
that the waivers should not be enforceable. Allowing companies to simply 
opt out of exposure to collective litigation is no more defensible than a sys­
tem in which corporations may decide whether they wish to be exposed to 
federal antitrust, securities, or civil rights laws. Indeed, it is less defensible, 
insofar as collective action waivers will invariably be buried in a mountain 
of terms and conditions, while substantive liability waivers might be ex­
pected to garner some attention. 
The scholarship on class action practice has thus far consisted of doc­
trinal critiques, letters to Congress, moralist manifestos and economists' 
prescriptions for optimized class action rules from many of our great schol­
ars. With the class action rule itself a seemingly permanent fixture on the 
legal landscape, scholarly attention has naturally been drawn to optimizing 
the legal rules that govern its operation. But with the advent of collective 
action waivers, the issues that face class actions have changed and the ques­
tions that scholars ask must also change. Do we allow companies to opt out 
of all potential classwide liability, or don't we? My hope is that we will see 
significant scholarship focused on this elemental question. Because sud­
denly, the question matters. 
268. Id. at 467 ("In most of the consumer class actions, the amounts at stake were small 
enough that most lawyers would not have taken non-class cases."). 
269. 4 1 7  U.S. 1 56, 1 6 1  (1974); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 
( 1 985) ("Class actions . . .  may permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to 
litigate individually. For example, this lawsuit involves claims averaging about $ 100 per plaintiff; 
most of the plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available."). 
